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I. INTRODUCTION

Today, perhaps more than ever before, state supreme courts will have
ample opportunity to be rights innovators. If President Trump is to be
believed, the federal courts are increasingly populated by Trump judges
who will not expand individual rights through interpretations of the
Federal Constitution.' Indeed, with at least two Trump appointees-Neil
Gorsuch and Brett Kavanaugh--already on the U.S. Supreme Court,
there is every reason to think that the Court will restrict rights
protections. Moreover, with a record-setting pace to appoint and confirm
lower federal court judges, 2 there is increasing reason to think that lower
federal courts will not advance individual rights interests either.
In the pages that follow, I will tackle the question of whether state
supreme courts will fill in gaps left open by federal courts' interpretations
of the U.S. Constitution. In today's hyper-polarized world, the question
of what state courts are and are not willing to do is stunningly important.
In the 29th Annual State Constitutional Law Lecture at Rutgers Law
School, Sixth Circuit Judge Jeffery Sutton embraced the promise of state
constitutionalism by calling on both advocates and state court judges to
play a leadership role in advancing individual rights through interpretations of state constitutions. 3 In part, my Article is a response to
Judge Sutton. And while I do not disagree with Judge Sutton's thoughtful
rendering of what state courts have done and what state courts are

1. It may be, however, that today's Supreme Court is (as Justice Elena Kagan put it)
"weaponizing" the First Amendment and other individual rights protections. Adam Liptak,
How Conservatives Weaponized the FirstAmendment, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2018), https://
www.nytimes.com/2018/06/30/us/politics/first-amendment-conservatives-supreme-court.ht
ml. In other words, the Court might interpret individual rights protections to advance
conservative but not progressive interests.
2. See Carrie Johnson, Trump's JudicialAppointments Were Confirmed at a Historic
Pace in 2018, NAT'L PUB. RADIO (Jan. 2, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/01/02/
Asher
681208228/trumps-judicial-appointments-were-confirmed-at-historic-pace-in-2018;
Stockler, Trump JudicialAppointments Reach Milestone, Over 150 Judges Confirmed with
One Year Left to Go, NEWSWEEK (Sept. 14, 2019), https://www.newsweek.com/trumpjudicial-appointments- 150-senate- 1459295.
3. Jeffrey S. Sutton, The Enduring Salience of State Constitutional Law, 70 RUTGERS
U. L. REV. 791, 796 (2019). For recent embraces of state constitutionalism by state supreme
court justices (one by a liberal justice who sees state courts as separate spheres of
constitutional authority and one by a conservative justice critical of the Roberts Court's
reluctance to embrace conservative causes through interpretations of constitutional
liberties), see Goodwin Liu, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights: A
Reappraisal, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1307, 1315 (2017); Clint Bolick, State Constitutions:
Freedom'sFrontier, 2016 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 15, 19 (2016-17).
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capable of doing, I will focus my energies on the roadblocks before state
courts-roadblocks that make me skeptical that today's state courts will
fill the void the U.S. Supreme Court is likely to leave.
To make his point about the promise of state constitutionalism,
Judge Sutton presented a hypothetical where a basketball player has the
opportunity to take two foul shots but only takes one. 4 Judge Sutton said
the failure of lawyers to advance both state and federal constitutional
claims was analogous to the basketball player's failure to take both foul
shots.5 Moreover, he said that the corresponding failure of state court
judges to independently interpret their constitutions was similarly
shortsighted. 6
No doubt, this plea for both advocates and judges to see state
constitutional law as a vital pathway makes great sense. Indeed, at his
Supreme Court confirmation hearing, then-Judge Kavanaugh ropeatedly
praised Judge Sutton and his book, 51 Imperfect Solutions: States and
the Making of American Constitutional Law, on which Judge Sutton
based his 2018 State Constitutional Law Lecture. 7 Here are two
examples: in response to questioning from Senate Judiciary Committee
Chair Chuck Grassley, Judge Kavanaugh referenced "a new book [by
Judge Jeff Sutton] about using state constitutions to help protect your
individual liberties and rights too."8 More telling is Judge Kavanaugh's
response to Senator Jeff Flake's questioning about precedent: Judge
Kavanaugh spoke of 51 Imperfect Solutions as "a great book about how
state constitutions can, and state constitutional law and state statutes
can enhance protections of individual liberty, even beyond what the
Supreme Court has interpreted the Federal Constitution to be." 9
This call for state courts to step up to the plate echoes what may be
the most important article ever written on state constitutionalism. In
1977, U.S Supreme Court Justice (and former New Jersey Supreme
Court Justice) William Brennan published State Constitutions and the

4.
5.
6.
7.
SPAN

Sutton, supra note 3, at 792-93.
Id. at 793.
Id.
Supreme Court Nominee Brett Kavanaugh Confirmation Hearing, Day 2, Part 1, C(Sept.

5,

2018),

https://www.c-span.org/video/?449705- 1/supreme-court-nominee-

brett-kavanaugh-confirmation-hearing-day-2-part-1;

see

JEFFREY

S.

SUTTON,

51

IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS: STATES AND THE MAKING OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

(2018).
8. Supreme Court Nominee Brett Kavanaugh Confirmation Hearing, Day 2, Part 1,
supranote 7, at 27:14.
9. Supreme Court Nominee Brett Kavanaugh Confirmation Hearing, Day 2, Part4, at
1:05:10, C-SPAN (Sept. 5, 2018), https://www.c-span.org/video/?449705- 14/supreme-courtnominee-brett-kavanaugh-confirmation-hearing-day-2-part-4&start=3831.
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Protectionof Individual Rights.10 Bemoaning the U.S. Supreme Court's
increasing conservativism, Brennan called on state court judges and
justices to pick up the slack and recognize rights claims that would no
longer be recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court.1 1 Celebrating the New
Jersey Supreme Court and other state courts that "have independently
considered the merits of constitutional arguments and declined to follow
opinions of the United States Supreme Court they found unconvincing,"
Brennan sought to put "to rest the notion that state constitutional
provisions were adopted to mirror the federal Bill of Rights." 12
Judge Sutton and now Justice Kavanaugh have both embraced the
Justice Brennan article when calling upon state courts to independently
interpret their state constitutions.13 Unlike Justice Brennan, who saw
state courts as a second best option, 14 Judge Sutton and Justice
Kavanaugh extoll our system of federalism15 when calling for state courts
16
to fill the void that they and other federal court judges will leave open.
For reasons I will now detail, I am skeptical that there will be a
renaissance of state constitutionalism in the age of party polarization. In
particular, I will argue that-on matters where the U.S. Supreme Court
has limited the reach of individual rights protections-state supreme
10. See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977).
11. Id. at 502-04.
12. Id. at 500-01.
13. SUTTON, supra note 7, at 99 ("What was true in 1977 appears to be just as true in
2018."); Supreme Court Nominee Brett Kavanaugh Confirmation Hearing, Day 2, Part 4,
supra note 9.
14. See Earl M. Maltz, False Prophet--Justice Brennan and the Theory of State
Constitutional Law, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 429, 429-30 (1988). For a forthright
acknowledgement that nationalists look to state constitutions only when federal courts will
not provide nationwide relief, see Erwin Chemerinsky, Two Cheers for State Constitutional
Law, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1695, 1696 (2010).
15. Judge Sutton, for example, talks about "honor[ing] the original design of the
federalist system." Sutton, supra note 3, at 795. In his thoughtful review of Judge Sutton's
book, California Supreme Court Justice Goodwin Liu distinguishes Judge Sutton's embrace
of federalism from Justice Brennan's embrace of "individual rights maximalism." Goodwin
Liu, State Courts and Constitutional Structure, 128 YALE L.J. 1304, 1365 (2019) ("Judge
Sutton's concerns .. . are primarily structural and focus on the process by which individual
rights take shape in our diverse democracy."). For a discussion of Justice Kavanaugh's
embrace of state constitutionalism in our federalist system, see supra notes 7-9.
16. I do not mean to be making a backhanded compliment. Judge Sutton's and Justice
Kavanaugh's interpretations may be correct. Moreover, some progressives have also joined
the call for state courts to engage in "progressive federalism" and fill the gap left open by
the U.S. Supreme Court. See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, A New Progressive Federalism,
https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/24/a-new(2012),
J.
IDEAS
DEMOCRACY:
progressive-federalism/; Sam Wang, If the Supreme Court Won't Prevent Gerrymandering,
Who Will?, N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/13/opinion/
sunday/partisan-gerrymandering.html.
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courts are unlikely to fill the void by interpreting their constitutions more
broadly than the U.S. Supreme Court interprets the Federal
Constitution.17 That is not to say that the U.S. Supreme Court will
always rule against individual rights for plaintiffs,18 but that state
supreme courts will rarely use their state constitutions to buck U.S.
Supreme Court decision-making. In part, state courts are subject to the
"gravitational pull" of federal norms 19-an outgrowth of judicial elections
and other democratic checks on state supreme courts. More than that,
unlike 1977 (when Justice Brennan published his article), political
polarization stands in the way of state experimentation. National
interest groups and a growing homogeneity in both red and blue states
stand as a barrier to state court innovation. 20
My Article will be divided into three parts. First, in Part II, I will
discuss the implications of democratic checks on state judges and the
gravitational pull of federal norms. Second, in Part III, I will examine the
ramifications of party polarization on state court innovation. In so doing,
I will explain why the very forces that speak to the need for state court
innovation cut against the likelihood of the states actually innovating.
Third, in Part IV, I will call attention to what would appear to be
counterexamples to my claims-2017-19 state court rulings invalidating
or enjoining state districting laws and abortion restrictions in Alaska,
Florida, Iowa, Kansas, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania. 21 These
Trump-era decisions certainly underscore that state courts will
sometimes invoke state constitutions to invalidate state laws and expand
rights protections. Upon closer examination however, these decisions
highlight backlash risks and the ultimate futility of looking to state

17.

State supreme courts, of course, will render important constitutional rulings on

matters, like affirmative rights, where state constitutions provide individual rights
protections that have no federal constitutional analog. See infra text accompanying notes
69-71. My focus, instead, is national matters-where the U.S. Supreme Court could
interpret the Federal Constitution to provide for the protection of individual rights.
18. See Liptak, supra note 1 (noting that the Roberts Court has advanced conservative
legal policy goals by expanding the boundaries of the First Amendment).
19. This phrase plays off of Scott Dodson in The GravitationalForce of Federal Law,
164 U. PA. L. REV. 703 (2016).
20. See infra Section III.B.
21. My focus is state supreme courts, not lower state courts. With the exception of North
Carolina (a lower court ruling that was not appealed), Part Four considers only state
supreme court rulings. See Michael Wines & Richard Fausset, North Caroliaa'sLegislative
Maps Are Thrown Out by State Court Panel, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2019), https://
I
www.nytimes.com/2019/09/03/us/north-carolina-gerrymander-unconstitutional.html.
include North Carolina in Part Four because the state supreme court figured prominently
in the decision not to appeal. See infra text accompanying note 276.
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courts to buck the state political establishment and, in so doing, fill
whatever void may be left by the U.S. Supreme Court. 22
II. THE GRAVITATIONAL PULL OF FEDERAL NORMS
State supreme courts always operate at a disadvantage. In part, state
courts are subject -to democratic controls and other structural limits.
These limitations accentuate backlash risks and make state court judges
cautious when interpreting state law. 23 More than that, state courts and
state laws are often seen as a poor cousin to federal courts and federal
laws. This dominance of federal norms casts a shadow from which state
courts cannot readily escape.

A.

Democratic Controls

State supreme court justices are typically subject to some type of
election and certainly lack life tenure; are often compelled to hear state
constitutional challenges to state law;. and their decisions are often
subject to override by way of voter referendum or legislative override. 24
Ten years ago, I wrote a paper examining the nexus between these
democratic controls and the willingness of state supreme courts to
expand rights protections. 25 In particular, I identified the characteristics
of seven state supreme courts willing to issue path-breaking individual
rights decisions, focusing on same-sex marriage. 26 Decided between 1993
and 2009 (when public opinion was in flux but always opposed to samesex marriage), 27 these cases presented state supreme courts with an
opportunity to be in the vanguard of rights-expanding decision-making.
Four state supreme courts mandated same-sex marriage (Massachusetts,
22. Part Four will also discuss 2017-19 decisions by the Washington Supreme Court
(invalidating state death penalty legislation) and by the Arizona Supreme Court (providing
religious liberty protections to businesses who refuse to provide custom services to samesex weddings). These two cases call attention to the willingness of state justices to back the
prevailing preferences of the state political establishment when confronted with either
outdated legislation or local initiatives that are out-of-step with statewide preferences.
23. See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl & Ethan J. Leib, Elected Judges and Statutory
Interpretation,79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1215, 1227-28, 1227 n.39 (2012). The concern of this paper
is state constitutional law as an alternative to federal constitutional law, but democratic
accountability is also relevant to state statutory law.
24. Neal Devins, How State Supreme Courts Take Consequences into Account: Toward
a State-Centered Understandingof State Constitutionalism, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1629, 164449, 1666-67, 1686 (2010).
25. Id. at 1632-34.
26. Id. at 1675-91.
27. See Attitudes on Same-Sex Marriage, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (May 14, 2019),
https://www.pewforum.org/fact-sheet/changing-attitudes-on-gay-marriage/.
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California, Connecticut, Iowa); two mandated civil union protections
(Vermont, New Jersey); one (Hawai'i) said that bans on same-sex
marriage were subject to strict scrutiny review but intervening political
developments prevented the court from issuing a definitive ruling. 28
In making sense of why these courts acted to protect the rights of
same-sex couples (while many other state supreme courts ducked the
issue entirely or backed the state ban), I discovered that pathbreaking
courts were far more politically insulated than most state courts. 29 In
other words, there was less backlash risk in these states because of both
the norms of judicial independence and, more importantly, the structural
protections afforded state supreme court justices and state court
decision-making. 30 I also discovered that elected officials and voters in
these states were more supportive of same-sex unions than elected
officials and voters in other states. 31 In other words, the willingness of a
state court to question the state marriage ban appeared highly correlated
to backlash risks.32
More than anything, judicial selection and retention influence state
justices. Thirty-eight states mandate that state supreme court justices
are subject to some kind of election. 33 Twenty mandate contested
elections where justices serve specified terms of office; eighteen make use
of retention elections (where justices are typically appointed by the
governor who chooses from a list of names compiled by a state
commission). 34 Needless to say, judges take election risks into account.

28. Devins, supra note 24, at 1675. Specifically, Hawai'i lawmakers enacted domestic
partnership legislation in 1997 and Hawai'i voters amended the state constitution to forbid
same-sex marriage in 1998. David Orgon Coolidge, The Hawai'i MarriageAmendment: Its
Origins, Meaning and Fate, 22 U. HAW. L. REV. 19, 20 (2000).
29. Devins, supra note 24, at 1678.
30. Id. at 1679-83. The proponents of same-sex marriage were all aware of the tenure
and selection processes for state justices; their litigation strategy focused on states with
structural protections for state justices. ROBERT J. HUME, COURTHOUSE DEMOCRACY AND
MINORITY RIGHTS: SAME-SEX MARRIAGE IN THE STATES 7-8 (2013); see also Mary L.
Bonnauo, Equality and the Impossible-State Constitutions and Marriage,68 RUTGERS U.
L. REV. 1481 (2016).
31. Devins, supra note 24, at 1679-83. Relatedly, state courts are sometimes
empowered to strike down laws that have fallen out of favor with state voters and the
officials they elect. Sean Beienburg & Paul Frymer, The People Against Themselves:
Rethinking Popular Constitutionalism,41 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 241, 257-58 (2016). In this
way, courts subject to democratic checks may sometimes invalidate unpopular laws. See id.
32. This is not to say that the legal policy view of these or other courts was not also
critical to determining whether there is a state constitutional right to same-sex marriage.
33. Devins, supra note 24, at 1648.
34. For an inventory of judicial selection and retention schemes (in 2010), see Devins,
supra note 24, at 1644-49. For a thoughtful accounting of changes in state judicial elections
over time (and the complicated dance between judicial independence and accountability),
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"[L]ike all policymakers in a democracy, [state supreme court justices]
must retain their posts in order to achieve their policy goals."35
With regard to same-sex marriage, none of the seven pathbreaking
state supreme courts come from the twenty-one states where justices run
in a contested election. 36 Two of the seven (California and Iowa) come
from the eighteen states that make use of retention elections; one of these
two (Iowa) is obligated to hear constitutional challenges to state laws. 37
Even more telling, five of these seven state supreme courts are among
the eleven states where supreme court justices neither run in contested
elections nor retention elections. 38 These five states are Massachusetts,
Connecticut, Vermont, New Jersey, and Hawai'i. 39 Two of these state
supreme courts are among the four states where state justices are not
subject to reelection or reappointment, and Hawai'i is- the only state
where judicial reappointment is made by a judicial commission.40
Moreover, before 2008, there was little risk of electoral defeat in
retention elections. From 1990 to. 2000, 1.7% of state justices were
defeated in retention elections; 41 from 1994 to 2006, judges lost retention
elections around 1% of the time.4 2 No doubt, Iowa Supreme Court
Justices thought there was little to no retention risk when ruling in favor
of same-sex marriage in April 2009. Earlier in 2009, state lawmakers
refused to vote on a proposed state constitutional ban on same-sex
marriage (a proposal that was also opposed by Iowa's Democratic
governor, Chet Culver). 43 Perhaps more significantly, no Iowa Justice
see G. ALAN TARR, WITHOUT FEAR OR FAVOR 63-66 (2012). For discussion of recent changes
in judicial selection/retention, see infra text Section III.B.2.
35. Elisha Carol Davchak & A.J. Barghothi, The Influence of Appointment and
Retention Constituencies Testing Strategies of JudicialDecisionmaking, 7 ST. POL. & POL'Y
Q. 394, 396 (2007).
36. Devins, supranote 24, at 1676.
37. Id. at 1676-78.
38. Id. at 1676.
39. Id.
40. Id. The New Jersey scheme allows the governor to reappoint after an initial term
of seven years; state justices can then serve without voter or gubernatorial check until they
reach the age of 70. N.J. CONST. art. 6, § 6, para. 3.
41. Chris W. Bonneau, Electoral Verdicts: Incumbent Defeats in State Supreme Court
Elections, 33 AM. POL. RES. 818, 825 (2005).
42. Larry Aspin, Judicial Retention Election Trends: 1964-2006, 90 JUDICATURE 208,
210 (2007).
43. Monica Davey, Same-Sex Ruling Belies the Staid Image of Iowa: Using 'Live and
Let Live'as a Legal Term, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2009, at 14. In California, the state's political
establishment had also signaled limited support for same-sex marriage. See Kate Folmar,
Governor Supports Gay Rights, but Won't Assign Same-Sex Marriage Bill, THE MERCURY
NEWS (Mar. 7, 2007, 9:47 PM), https://www.mercurynews.com/2007/03/07/governorsupports-gay-rights-but-wont- sign-same-sex- marriage-bill/. Legislation legalizing samesex marriage was enacted by the state legislature in 2005 only to be vetoed by California
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had ever been ousted in a retention vote. 4 Think again; thanks to out-ofstate political interests who spent heavily to oust three Iowa Supreme
Court Justices in 2010 retention votes, the heretofore politically
insulated Iowa Supreme Court became the politically vulnerable Iowa
Supreme Court.45
The risk of electoral defeat-while most important-is not the only
reason that state supreme courts calibrate their decision-making by
taking into account backlash risks. Unlike federal constitutional rulings
(which are next to impossible to nullify through legislation or
constitutional amendment), state constitutional rulings are far easier to
negate. Only one of the founding states (Massachusetts) has its original
constitution and more than thirty states have had multiple
constitutions.4 6 Voters too can strike against state supreme court
decisions they dislike; twenty-five states allow for voters to amend their
constitutions through initiatives. 47 In all fifty states, lawmakers can
propose state constitutional amendments.48 Assuming that state
supreme court justices seek to maximize their legal policy preferences,
the risk of constitutional override is clearly something to take into
account.4 9
Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger; Schwarzenegger-who ran as a pro-gay rights
Republican-said that the issue should be settled by the California Supreme Court. Id.
More generally, judges expanded marriage rights to same-sex couples in a way that "usually
aligned with public opinion." John B. Kastellec, JudicialFederalismand Representation, 6
J.L. & CTS. 51, 72 (2018).
44. See Mallory Simon, Iowa Voters Oust Justices Who Made Same-Sex MarriageLegal,
CNN (Nov. 3, 2010), http://www.cnn.com/2010/POLITICS/11/03/iowa.judges/index.html.
45. See A.G. Sulzberger, Ouster of Iowa Judges Sends Signal to Bench, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 3, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/04/us/politics/04judges.html. For an
insightful analysis of this decision, see generally David E. Pozen, What Happened in Iowa?,
111 COLUM. L. REV. (SIDEBAR) 90, 90-91 (2011). For additional discussion, see infra text
accompanying notes 197-200.
46. See Donald A. Lutz, Toward a Theory of ConstitutionalAmendment, in RESPONDING
TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 237, 248-

49 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995).
47.
See DANIEL A. SMITH & CAROLINE J. TOLBERT, EDUCATED BY INITIATIVE: THE
EFFECTS OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY ON CITIZENS AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE
AMERICAN STATES 24-25 (2004); M. DANE WATERS, THE INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM

ALMANAC 13 n.1 (2d ed. 2018).
48. WATERS, supra note 47. For a discussion of how voter and lawmaker amendments
constrain state courts, see JOHN DINAN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS: GOVERNING BY
AMENDMENT IN THE AMERICAN STATES 13, 111 (2018). For an example of a state supreme

court opinion explicitly recognizing these risks (as constraining state court innovation in
cases where the U.S. Supreme Court rules narrowly), see State v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338, 34546 (1982).
49. With regard to the U.S. Supreme Court, Lee Epstein and Jack Knight have
advanced the so-called external strategic actor model. LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE
CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 9-10 (1998). That model suggests that justices will push their
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On same-sex marriage, the seven pathbreaker state supreme courts
generally faced little risk of voters or legislators nullifying their
constitutional rulings.5 0 Of the seven states, only California and
Massachusetts allow for voters to place constitutional amendments on
the ballots. 51 Massachusetts, however, requires state lawmakers to
support the placing of an initiative on the ballot .in two consecutive
sessions. 52 Perhaps for this reason, Massachusetts has the eighth lowest
constitutional amendment rate of all states. 53
Of the five pathbreaking states that do not allow for initiatives,
Hawai'i is the only one with a high constitutional amendment rate (a rate
of 2.56, which is the sixth highest). 54 The other four have low amendment
rates and hard to amend constitutions. 5 Iowa has tied for the fifth lowest
amendment rate;5 6 legislature-proposed amendments in Iowa must be
considered in two successive sessions.5 7 Connecticut has a three-fourth
supermajority vote requirement in each house; Vermont only allows
amendments once every four years and requires super-majority approval
in consecutive legislative sessions; and New Jersey requires supermajority approval in one session or majority approval in consecutive
sessions. 58
Significantly, the two states with either voter initiatives (California)
or high constitutional amendment rates (Hawai'i) both nullified their
state supreme court rulings through constitutional amendment.59 One of
the two with retention elections (Iowa) ousted three Iowa Supreme Court
Justices. 60 There is little question that state supreme court justices have
good reason to take backlash risks into account. Even though the seven
pathbreaking state supreme courts were more politically insulated than
most state supreme courts, the fact that three of these seven fell prey to
either electoral defeat or amendment override is telling. For this very

preferences as far as they can without risking counterproductive backlash. Id. There is no
reason to think that state justices would not do the same. Indeed, state backlash risks are
much greater and, as such, the Epstein-Knight model is more sensibly applied to state
supreme courts than to the U.S. Supreme Court. See also Lutz, supra note 46.
50. See Devins, supranote 24, at 1676.
51. Id. at 1677.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Lutz, supra note 46.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Devins, supra note 24, at 1677.
58. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE BOOK OF STATES 14-15 tbl. 1.2 (2009); id. at
1641 n.55, 1678.
59. See Devins, supra note 24, at 1681-83.
60. See Pozen, supranote 45, at 90.
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reason, most state supreme courts are reluctant to play a pathbreaking
role.
Correspondingly, a substantial number of state supreme courts
"lockstep" their interpretations of state constitutional provisions to U.S.
Supreme Court interpretations of the Federal Constitution. 61 After all,
there is no better way to obviate electoral risks and insulate your
decision-making than to claim that there is no independent state voice in
interpreting state constitutional provisions. "Similarly, it is far easier for
a state judge to tell voters that her opinion follows the reasoning of the
Supreme Court than to try to explain why she diverged." 62
Several state supreme courts are further limited because they are
obligated to hear all state constitutional challenges to state law. Unlike
the U.S. Supreme Court, some state courts cannot exercise the so-called
"passive virtues" and delay consideration of politically knotty cases. 63 On
same-sex marriage, state supreme courts in Iowa, Vermont, and New
Jersey had no choice but to resolve legal challenges to the state ban. 64
Perhaps for this reason, the Vermont and New Jersey Supreme Courts
did not establish a right to same-sex marriage-opting, instead, to
mandate that the state recognize either civil unions or same-sex
marriage.65 Indeed the Vermont Supreme Court openly discussed its fear
of a potential in-state backlash, noting that "[w]hen a democracy is in
moral flux .... [j]udicial answers . . . . may be counterproductive even if
66
they are right."

In addition to docket control limits, several state supreme courts are
subject to requirements that essentially compel them to actively
participate in the policy process.6 7 Some state courts must issue advisory
opinions regarding the constitutionality of state law; some state courts
61. For a good summary of the various ways that state courts lockstep, see Robert F.
Williams, State Courts Adopting Federal Constitutional Doctrine: Case-By-Case
Adoptionism or ProspectiveLockstepping?, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1499, 1505-27 (2005).
For an examination of the various reasons state courts copy federal constitutional doctrine,
see James A. Gardner, State ConstitutionalRights as Resistance to National Power, 91 GEO.
L.J. 1003, 1058-64 (2003). For a critique of lockstepping, see Jeffrey S. Sutton, Why Teachand Why Study-State Constitutional Law, 34 OxLA. CITY U. L. REV. 165, 174-78 (2009).
62. Dodson, supra note 19, at 741.
63. Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the "Passive Virtues": Rethinking the Judicial
Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1834-40 (2001) (providing a discussion of the "passive
virtues" and state courts). The classic defense of this practice can be found in ALEXANDER
M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 169-70 (2nd ed. 1986).
64. Devins, supra note 24, at 1678.
65. Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 224 (N.J. 2006); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 887,
889 (Vt. 1999).
66. Baker, 744 A.2d at 888. For a more detailed statement by Vermont Chief Justice
Jeffrey Amestoy, see Bonnauo, supra note 30, at 1509.
67. Devins, supra note 24, 1649.
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cannot make use of standing-to-sue limitations to avoid politically
controversial cases; and some state courts adhere to the state action or
separation of powers doctrine that thrust them into such political
disputes. 68 State court policymaking is also fueled by state constitutional
provisions providing for positive rights, including welfare rights and
affirmative rights to education.6 9 These positive rights provisions have
no analog in the Federal Constitution and cannot be lockstepped; they
must be given effect through state court interpretations. For example,
state supreme courts must give meaning to state constitutional
provisions that treat education as a fundamental right and sometimes
speak of the state's obligation to provide a "high quality system of free
public schools."70 Likewise, state courts have no choice but to interpret
state constitutional demands that elections be "free and equal" or "free
and open." 71 Furthermore, "[c]ontrary to the limited, interstitial role
played by federal courts," state courts often serve as "principal lawgivers
within their jurisdictions through the evolution and application of the
common law." 72 State judges, for example, set policy in highly charged
fields like tort law. 73
Unable to avoid politically charged disputes, state judges are
necessarily cautious-specially in states where democratic checks make
them and their decisions politically vulnerable. In today's polarized
world, state courts must still confront the inherent limits that already
constrain them. This, of course, is not to say that state courts do not play
an important role shaping constitutional values through pathbreaking
interpretations of state constitutional provisions. They certainly do and

68.
69.

Id. at 1650-52.
See EMILY ZACKIN,

LOOKING FOR RIGHTS IN ALL THE WRONG PLACES:
WHY STATE CONSTITUTIONS CONTAIN AMERICA'S POSITIVE RIGHTS 2-3 (2013); Helen

Heshkoff, "Just Words"` Common Law and the Enforcement of State ConstitutionalSocial
and Economic Rights, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1521, 1522-23 (2010). In addition to explicit
protections for positive rights, state constitutions contain "provisions [that] materially
differ from analogous federal protections in their text, purpose, or history." Liu, supra note
3, at 1313. State courts, for example, have interpreted free exercise provisions to be more
protective of religious liberty and antiestablishment provisions as erecting a higher wall of
church-state separation. Id.
70. FL. CONST. art. IX, § 1(a). See generally Jeffrey A. Sutton, San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez and Its Aftermath, 94 VA. L. REV. 1963 (2008) (discussing a
state supreme court's role in education funding cases).
71. See Joshua A. Douglas, The Right to Vote Under State Constitutions, 67 VAND. L.
REV. 89, 103 (2014).
72. Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced
ConstitutionalNorms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1256 (1978).
73. Hans A. Linde, Courts and Torts: "Public Policy" Without Public Politics?, 28 VAL.
U. L. REV. 821, 821, 852-3 (1994).
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Judge Sutton is right to highlight some of those decisions. 74 Nonetheless,
as this Section makes clear, backlash risks are real and limit state court
activism.
Also shedding light on this phenomenon is the response of state
courts and state voters to Justice Brennan's 1977 call for state courts to
fill the void increasingly left open by the U.S. Supreme Court.75 Following
publication of the Brennan article, some state courts jumped into the
abyss-bucking public opinion and expanding the scope of individual
rights protections to, for example, those either accused or convicted of a
crime.76 Voters and legislators struck back, however. In California, antideath penalty justices were voted out in 1986 retention elections; 77 in
Florida, the state amended its constitution in 1983 to mandate
"lockstepping" in search and seizure cases.78 State supreme courts
learned their lesson; there was a noticeable uptick in lockstepping and
the willingness of state justices to expand rights protections abated.79
In the age of party polarization, the lesson of the 1980s backlash is
striking. Judicial elections are no longer "sleepy . . . affairs."8 0 Instead,
party polarization both exacerbates backlash risks and otherwise makes
it less likely that state courts will disagree with the legal policy
judgments embedded in state laws.8 1 Part III will address polarization's
impact on state constitutional law. For the balance of this Section, I will
examine why it is that federal norms (and federal court decisions)
dominate state norms-further complicating the pursuit of state
constitutionalism.

74. See SUTTON, supra note 7, at 58-62.
75. See Brennan, supra note 10, at 489.
76. See James A. Gardner, Justice Brennan and the Foundations of Human Rights
Federalism, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 355, 362-63 (2016).
77. Claire Machado, Did the Politicization of the Supreme Court Start in California?,
BERKELEY POL. REV. (Jan. 28, 2019), https://bpr.berkeley.edul2019/01/28/did-thepoliticalization-of-the-supreme-court-start-in-californial.
78. Christopher Slobogin, State Adoption of Federal Law: Exploring the Limits of
Florida's"ForcedLinkage"Amendment, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 653, 654 (1987).
79. See James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism,90 MICH.
L. REV. 761, 788-89 (1992). Similarly, Dan Rodriguez observed that Justice Brennan's
article, ultimately, was of little practical import. Daniel B. Rodriguez, State Constitutional
Theory and Its Prospects, 28 N.M. L. REV. 271, 271 (1998). At the same time, as Judge
Sutton appropriately highlights in his book, state supreme courts played a figural role in
the Supreme Court's 1961 adoption of the exclusionary rule in Mapp v. Ohio. See SUTTON,
supra note 7, at 42-62.
80. David E. Pozen, The Irony of Judicial Elections, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 265, 266-67
(2008) (citations omitted).
81. See id. at 279-90 (discussing the issue of the "majoritarian difficulty," whereby
judges who are accountable to a majority of the electorate may struggle to uphold
constitutional principles that are disfavored by the public).
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B. The Pull of FederalSupremacy
The mitigating influence of backlash risks almost certainly explains
the prevalence of lockstepping and the reluctance of state supreme courts
to play a pathbreaking role on individual rights. Beyond these inherent
limits of an election-driven state supreme court system, "[w]hen
Americans speak of 'constitutional law,' they invariably mean the U.S.
Constitution and the substantial body of federal judicial decisions
construing it."82 Indeed, state court justices, state attorneys general,
private sector lawyers, and law schools treat federal law as supreme-so
much so that state claims are denigrated, not celebrated. 83 This is Judge
Sutton's quite legitimate beef with the legal system, and he is quite right
in seeing it as one of the reasons state constitutionalism has not achieved
the lofty status it deserves.84
Judge Sutton points in particular to the failure of lawyers to raise
state constitutional arguments.85 Relatedly, Judge Sutton links this
failure to legal educators who are generally uninterested in state
constitutional law as a subject to teach or to write scholarly articles on.8 6
As far as lawyers, Justice David Souter echoed Judge Sutton's lament.8 7
When sitting as a Justice on the New Hampshire Supreme Court, Souter
observed that attorneys sometimes relied exclusively on federal
constitutional law and did not even brief state law claims. 88 Without
arguments made and briefs filed, state judges lacked the tools needed to
develop an independent body of state constitutional law. For Souter, the
doctrine requires "developed advocacy from those who bring the cases."8 9
And while some (most notably Jim Gardner) think that lawyers have
ample incentives to pursue plausible state constitutional arguments,9 0 it
is nonetheless true that legal practice and the norms of the legal
profession cut against the pursuit of state constitutional arguments.

82.
JAMES A. GARDNER, INTERPRETING STATE CONSTITUTIONS: A JURISPRUDENCE OF
FUNCTION IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM 23 (2005).

83. National political parties could be added to this list of culprits. Most notably,
national political parties have long contributed to the nationalization of state laws. James
A. Gardner, The Myth of State Autonomy: Federalism, PoliticalParties, and the National
Colonization of State Politics, 29 J.L. & POL. 1, 39-41 (2013).
84. Sutton, supra note 3, at 793-95.
85. Id. at 793.
86. Id. at 793-94.
87. State v. Bradberry, 522 A.2d 1380, 1388-89 (N.H. 1986) (Souter, J., concurring).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1389.
90. See GARDNER, supra note 82, at 24.
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Law schools and law professors play a significant role here. 91 What
law students learn and what scholarly communities consider worthwhile
set a frame for state judges and the attorneys who practice before them.
Relatedly, the relative status of jobs in the legal profession is partially
determined by measures established by legal educators, so the
development of state law suffers if law students come to understand that
federal court clerkships and federal court practice is high status as
compared to state clerkships and practice. 92 On this score, law schools
are woefully delinquent. The required constitutional law class does not
consider state developments at all. 93 Most law schools do not offer a
separate law school class on state constitutional law, especially elite law
schools that establish trends that other law schools emulate. 94 Of the
twenty-four law schools offering a survey course in state constitutional
law, not one was rated within the top fifteen by U.S. News and World
Report.9 5 Commenting on this failure, Sandy Levinson bemoaned that
legal educators treat "state governments established by these
constitutions [as dealing with] mere trivialities" or raising "no interesting
interpretive issues of the kind that obsess legal academics."9 6 And while
Sandy sees these claims as "laughably-and sometimes tragicallyfalse," he also recognizes that the subordinate status of state
constitutions in the law school world is deeply engrained. 97
Law schools may be public enemy number one for wrongly
subordinating state supreme court decision-making, but state supreme
courts have also contributed to this state of affairs. Aside from
moderating their decision-making to avoid political attack, state supreme
courts have arguably undermined their own status in two distinctive
91. Sutton, supra note 61, at 166.
92. Id. at 171.
93. Id. at 166. At most (and this is what I do when teaching about same-sex sodomy
and same-sex marriage), law professors might make brief mention of antecedent state
developments that informed the U.S. Supreme Court or, alternatively, explain what state
courts did to limit the reach of a decision through rights-expanding interpretation of state
constitutions. I suspect that the half hour I dedicate to state developments (in a class that
meets for close to fifty hours) is more than most constitutional law professors.
94. Id. at 167-67.
95. Id. Things have changed slightly since Judge Sutton made that observation in 2009.
Judge Sutton, for example, often teaches a state constitutional law class in the January
session at the Harvard Law School.
96. Sanford Levinson, Courts as Participantsin "Dialogue" A View from American
States, 59 U. KAN. L. REV. 791, 798 (2011).
97. Id. Of course, there are important exceptions, and the annual constitutional law
lecture at Rutgers and its related state constitutional law symposium issue of the Rutgers
University Law Review is one of those exceptions. Relatedly, Rutgers' historic commitment
to state constitutional law through such wonderful scholars as Bob Williams and Alan Tarr
sets Rutgers apart.
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ways. First, state supreme courts have done little to develop state
constitutional law into a vibrant field by engaging in a debate about the
modalities of interpretation that state courts should use when
interpreting state constitutions.9 8 This failure to, among other things,
prune state-specific sources (the text and history of their state
constitutions) has resulted in a failure to "develop a coherent discourse
of state constitutional law."9 9 Second, state supreme courts often lockstep
their interpretations to federal courts because of the perceived
.superiority of federal court interpretations.1 0 0 "Federal law is [seen as]
prestigious, pervasive, and highly visible .... It is no wonder then that
state actors are drawn to it."101 Correspondingly, "the Supreme Court
commands a level of gravitas that seems to generate an expectation of
following absent compelling reason for deviation."10 2
There are other villains too. As Scott Dodson put it, "Today, in
virtually every legal position, state-focused lawyers look to move up to
federal focused positions."103 Here is a list of culprits: state supreme court
justices, state attorneys general and solicitors general, and law firms.
State supreme court justices aspire to be federal court judges and not
the other way around. Aside from job security (life tenure), better pay,
and better benefits, "the federal judicial system is generally seen as more
prestigious."104 Indeed, a 2017 study of 925 lateral moves from state to
federal and federal to state judiciaries found that 911 (98.5%) of the
lateral moves were from state to federal. 105 As might be expected, there
is a very long list of state judges and justices joining the U.S. Supreme
98. See Gardner, supranote 79, at 781-84.
99. Id. at 764. For a competing view, see Paul Kahn, Interpretationand Authority in
State Constitutionalism, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1147, 1155-56 (1993). See also Liu, supra note
3 (arguing that distinctive interpretive methodologies are beside the point and that "the
crucial point is that state courts, as the ultimate arbiters of state law, have the prerogative
and duty to interpret their state constitutions independently").
100. For an argument that federal court interpretations are, in fact, better, see Bert
Neuborne, The Myth ofParity, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1105, 1121-24 (1977). About a decade later,
Burt Neuborne retreated when delivering the Rutgers Law Journal State Constitutional
Law Lecture-arguing that state courts were well positioned to enforce positive rights. See
Burt Neuborne, State Constitutions and the Evolution of Positive Rights, 20 RUTGERS L.J.
881 (1989). For another competing perspective, see SUTTON, supra note 7, at 8-10.
101. Dodson, supra note 19 at 739. This is not to say that state judges would prefer a
different legal regime but feel compelled to lockstep. Instead, the most likely explanation is
that "state judges adopt the Supreme Court's approach because they like it and think that
it does a perfectly adequate job of protecting the liberty in question." Gardner, supra note
61, at 1059; see also Lawrence Friedman, Path Dependence and the External Constraints

on Independent State Constitutionalism, 115 PA. ST. L. REV. 783 (2011).
102. Dodson, supra note 19, at 741.
103. Id. at 739.
104. Jonathan R. Nash, JudicialLaterals, 70 VAND. L. REV. 1911, 1912-13 (2017).
105. Id. at 1927.
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Court (including Justices Oliver Wendall Holmes, Benjamin Cardozo,
William Brennan, Sandra Day O'Connor, and David Souter) or federal
courts of appeal (four of Donald Trump's short listers for the U.S.
Supreme Court-Allison Eid, David Stras, Don Willett, and Jane
Larsen-were state supreme court justices who, instead, were
"promoted" to federal courts of appeal). 106 More telling, federal judicial
nominees whose nominations are stalled sometimes accept the
"consolation prize" of becoming a state justice-this is how various news
outlets described Goodwin Liu's 2011 appointment to the California
Supreme Court (after senate. Republicans blocked his Ninth Circuit
appointment).10 7
State attorneys general and solicitors general increasingly seek fame
through the pursuit of high stakes, high visibility federal court litigation.
In recent years, Republican and Democratic attorneys general
increasingly participate in litigation targeting the opposition party
president (Republican attorneys general suing Barack Obama and
Democratic attorneys general suing Donald Trump). 108 For their part,
state solicitors general are the principal lawyers in these and other
federal court lawsuits. Following their stint as state solicitors general,
these lawyers often seek to lead federal appellate practice groups, teach
federal law subjects at law schools, or become a federal court judge or
other federal official. Examples abound. In Texas, Solicitors General Ted
Cruz and James Ho led federal appellate practice groups at Texas offices
of national law firms before becoming, respectively, a United States

106. Jessica Estepa, The 25 People Most Likely to Replace Anthony Kennedy on the
Supreme Court, USA TODAY (June 27, 2018, 3:13 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/
news/politics/onpolitics/2018/06/27/supreme-court-justice-shortlist/739221002/; Chuck Grassley, A HistoricYear for the FederalJudiciary, NAT'L REV. (Jan. 6, 2017, 9:00 AM), https:/
/www.nationalreview.com/2017/01/trump-judicial-appointments-supreme-court-justice-nei
1-gorsuch-federal-bench-senate-advice-consent/; see also BARRY J. McMILLION, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., R44235, SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENT PROCESS: PRESIDENT'S
SELECTION OF A NOMINEE 10-11 (2018).
107. Nathan Koppel, He's Back! Goodwin Liu Nominated to CaliforniaSupreme Court,
THE WALL STREET J.: L. BLOG (Jul. 26, 2011, 4:18 PM), https:/blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/07/
26/hes-back-goodwin-liu-nominated-to-california-supreme-court/;
Emil Guillermo, With
Goodwin Liu, Asian Americans Now the Majority on California'sHighest Court - But Is
Diversity the Winner?, ASIAN AM. LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND: BLOG (Sept. 1, 2011), https://
www.aaldef.org/blog/with-goodwin-liu-asian-americans-now-the-majority-on-californias-hi
ghest-court-but-is-diversity-the/; David Lat, A Conservative's Worst Nightmare: Justice
Goodwin Liu?, ABOVE L. (Jul. 26, 2011, 1:31 PM), https://abovethelaw.com/2011/07/aconservatives-worst-nightmare-justice-goodwin-liu.
108. See Maureen Groppe, Multistate Lawsuits Against Trump in 2 Years Exceed Those
Against Obama, Bush in 8 Years, USA TODAY (Apr. 10, 2019), https://www.usatoday.com/
story/news/politics/2019/04/10/donald-trump-sued-more-often-democratic-attorneys-gener
al/3143366002/.
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Senator and a federal court of appeals judge. 109 Other solicitors general
who either led or were prominent members of federal appellate practice
groups before becoming federal appellate court judges (or being
nominated to be a federal appellate judge) include Kevin Newsom
(Alabama, who now sits on the Eleventh Circuit), Caitlin Halligan (New
York, who was nominated to the D.C. Circuit), Eric Murphy (Ohio, who
now sits on the Sixth Circuit), and Jeff Sutton (Ohio, who now sits on the
Sixth Circuit). 110
Law firms certainly value federal law ahead of state law. Top law
school graduates seeking jobs at top law firms are most interested in
federal practice and federal judicial clerkships. 111 National law firms
seeking both to recruit these graduates and to represent large corporate
clients can demonstrate their bona fides as an elite law firm by
establishing federal appellate practice groups. 112 State law practice, even
practice before state supreme courts, lacks the panache of federal court
practice, and the websites of national law firms rarely call attention to
significant state matters in which their firms participate.
The gravitational pull of federal norms is pervasive. Notwithstanding
the purported benefits of a federalist system, where states serve as
laboratories of innovation,113 state supreme court justices and the

109. See James C. Ho, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wikilJamesC._Ho (last
https://en.wikipedia.org/wikil
Cruz, WIKIPEDIA,
Ted
2019);
15,
Oct.
visited
TedCruz#Return to-private-practice (last visited Oct. 15, 2019).
110. See Caitlin Halligan, WIKrPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wikilCaithn Halligan
(last visited Oct. 15, 2019); Former Jones Day Lawyers Chad Readler, Eric E. Murphy
Confirmed to U.S. Sixth Circuit Seats, JONES DAY (Mar. 2019), https://www.jonesday.com/
en/news/2019/03/chad-readler-eric-murphy-sixth-circuit; Jeffrey Sutton, WIKIPEDIA, https:/
(last visited Oct. 15, 2019); Kevin Newsom,
/en.wikipedia.org/wikilJeffreySutton
WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wikilKevinNewsom (last visited Oct. 15, 2019).
111. See Nicholas Alexiou, To Clerk or Not to Clerk. . . It's Actually Not Much of a
Question, ABOVE L. (June 7, 2018), https://abovethelaw.com/2018/06/to-clerk-or-not-toclerk-its-actually-not-much-of-a-question/. Correspondingly, top firms recruit top students
by providing opportunities to work on glitzy politically salient federal court litigation. Cf.
Annie Correal, Why Big Law Is Taking on Trump over Immigration, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21,
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/21/nyregion/president-trump-immigration-law2018),
firms.html.
112. Allison Orr Larsen & Neal Devins, The Amicus Machine, 102 VA. L. REV. 1901,
1964-65 (2016). Indeed, the Gibson, Dunn, & Crutcher Law Firm secured Walmart as a
client because of the prestige associated with its federal appellate shop. See Joan Biskupic
et al., At America's Court of Last Resort, A Handful of Lawyers Now Dominates the Docket,
REUTERS (Dec. 8, 2014, 10:30 AM), https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/
scotus.
113. Judge Sutton invokes the "laboratories" metaphor in explaining how there should
be a dialogue between state and federal courts in shaping constitutional meaning. Sutton,
supra note 3, at 797. Joseph Blocher made a somewhat similar argument, advocating that
federal courts should look to state court interpretations of analogous constitutional
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lawyers who practice before them prefer federal norms and federal
practice. As Judge Sutton rightfully laments, following federal norms and
federal practices comes at a cost. Most notably, "following can mar the
reputation of states as coequal sovereigns in a federalist system."114

Nonetheless, following is pervasive and likely to continue. As I will now
discuss, the gravitational pull of federal norms is also a byproduct of
party polarization. The more people identify with a defined party agenda,
the more national party norms define state and local politics.
III. THE IMPACT OF PARTY POLARIZATION
Party polarization exacerbates the gravitational pull of federal
norms. As noted at the start of this Article, polarization-at least with
Donald Trump as President and Republicans in control of the Senatecreates opportunities for state justices to fill the void and expand
individual rights protections. A Supreme Court dominated by Republican
appointees is likely to leave a wide berth for rights-expanding state
courts-at least with respect to progressive legal policy goals.115
Correspondingly, there is little prospect of the federal executive or
Congress pursuing rights-expanding policies. On the other hand, party
polarization makes it less likely that state courts will actually fill that
void. In part, there will be fewer cases where the legal policy preferences
of state supreme courts will be out of sync with state laws subject to
constitutional attack. Specifically, with the increasing alignment of
ideology and party identity, red and blue state courts are likely to agree
with red and blue state legislatures. 116 Polarization has also ushered in
the so-called era of McPolitics, or the nationalization and homogenization
of American political issues. 117 In so doing, polarization has shifted the
provisions (with reference but not limited to gun rights). Joseph Blocher, Reverse

Incorporationof State Constitutional Law, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 323, 363-64 (2011).
114. Dodson, supra note 19, at 706.
115. This is not to say that the Roberts Supreme Court is hostile to all rights claims. As
noted earlier, the Court has expanded First Amendment rights of religious interests,
corporations, and opponents of campaign finance restrictions. See Liptak, supranote 1. See
generally TIMOTHY ZicK, THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN THE TRUMP ERA (2019). The Roberts
Court also seems poised to expand Second Amendment protections. James Phillips & John
Yoo, Finally, The Supreme Court Is Taking Up Gun Rights Again, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 27,
2019, 3:15 AM), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-phillips-yoo-guns-court20190127-story.html.
116. See Adam Bonica & Michael J. Woodruff, A Common-Space Measure of State
Supreme Court Ideology, 31 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 472, 487 (2014).
117. See DANIEL J. HOPKINS, THE INCREASINGLY UNITED STATES: How AND WHY
AMERICAN POLITICAL BEHAVIOR NATIONALIZED 21 (2018); Yascha Mounk,

The Rise of

McPolitics, THE NEWYORKER (June 25, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/
07/02/the-rise-of-mcpolitics.
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focus away from state actors and state politics towards national actors.
For example, state attorneys general have little interest in advancing
state constitutional arguments when national policy issues can be
pursued in federal court. 118 Finally, there is also greater risk of political
backlash. 119 National interest groups are more apt to attack state
supreme court justices. State political actors too are more likely to take
action against state courts that break rank with party preferences.
A.

The Rise of PartyPolarization

In this age of party polarization, elected officials at both the federal
and state level tend to vote as distinctive ideological blocks and do not
cross party lines.1 2 0 More generally, Republicans and Democrats see
themselves as members of rival factions-a phenomenon reinforced by
social networks and media outlet.1 2 1 Today's ideological divide is
profound and pervasive; the ideological gap in today's Congress is greater
122
than at any time in the nation's history.
Today's divide has its roots in the 1980 election of Ronald Reagan.123
Throughout the New Deal and Great Society eras, the parties were not
divided.124 In 1968, for example, George Wallace justified his third-party
run for president by saying "there was not a 'dime's worth of difference'
between the [Republicans and Democrats]." 125 In other words, today's
ideological divide was largely nonexistent when Justice Brennan made
his 1977 plea for a revival of state constitutionalism. At that time, there
was virtually no gap in the median liberal-conservative scores of the two
parties: there were northern liberal Rockefeller Republicans and

118. For a good overview of state attorney general policymaking, see generally PAUL
NOLETIE, FEDERALISM ON TRIAL: STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL AND NATIONAL
POLICYMAKING IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 198-202 (2015). For additional discussion, see
infra text accompanying notes 159-83.
119. See infra Section IILB.2.
120. NEAL DEVINS & LAWRENCE BAUM, THE COMPANY THEY KEEP: How PARTISAN
DIVISIONS CAME TO THE SUPREME COURT 107-10 (2019).
121. See id. at 107.
122. Id. at 105-10.
123. Id. at 105.
124. Id.
125. Richard Pearson, Ex-Gov. George C. Wallace Dies at 79, WASH. POST (Sept. 14,
1998), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1998/09/14/ex-gov-george-c-wallac
e-dies-at-79/813dc676-3c32-4973-867e-24ebfcf447 15/?noredirect-on&utm term=.0eb06be6
6915.
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conservative Southern Democrats. 126 There were also moderates in both
parties.127

Following Ronald Reagan's victory in 1980, the moderate to liberal
wing of the Republican Party began to dissipate. 128 Also, there has been
a broader partisan sorting among voters, which has pushed both
Republican and Democratic members of Congress toward more extreme
positions.1 29 Growing extremism among party activists and campaign
contributors exerts a similar push.1 30 Further fueling these partisan
flames, computer-driven districting has helped produce high proportions
of safe seats in both federal and state legislatures, in turn giving
candidates an incentive to appeal primarily to partisans who vote in
primaries.1 31 By 2012, with the growth of the Tea Party, strong partisans
had replaced remaining moderates. 132
The polarization that is so evident among elected officials has also
permeated the public. "Republicans and Democrats increasingly dislike,
even loathe, their opponents."1 33 In 1980, voters gave their own party a
seventy-two and the opposing party a forty-five on a one-hundred-point
scale; in 2012, the opposing party had fallen to thirty.1 34 Polling data from
2010 showed 49% of Republicans and 33% of Democrats said they would
be unhappy if an immediate family member were to marry someone from
the opposition party (as compared to 5% of Republicans and 4% of

126. DEVINS & BAUM, supra note 120, at 105.
See STEVEN S. SMITH & GERALD GAMM, THE DYNAMICS OF PARTY GOVERNMENT IN
127.
CONGRESS IN CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 147 fig.7-2, 151 fig.7-4 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce
Oppenheimer eds., 9th ed. 2009); SEAN M. THERIAULT, PARTY POLARIZATION IN CONGRESS

23-28 (2008).
128. Reagan sought to appeal to conservative Southern Democrats by drawing an
ideological line separating Republicans from Democrats on issues like race, abortion, and
religion. On the role of civil rights in all this, see Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center Does
Not Hold: The Causes of HyperpolarizedDemocracy in America, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 273, 27897 (2011).
129. Id. at 278-80.
130. Id. at 298-99.
131. See Samuel Issacharoff, Collateral Damage: The Endangered Center in American
Politics, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 415, 428-31 (2004).
132. Neal Devins & Lawrence Baum, Split Definitive: How Party PolarizationTurned
the Supreme Court into a PartisanCourt, 2016 SUP. CT. REV. 301, 322. For example, the
advent of the Tea Party is credited with the strongly conservative Ted Cruz replacing
moderate Kay Bailey Hutchinson in the U.S. Senate. Id.
133. Shanto lyengar et al., Affect, Not Ideology: A Social Identity Perspective on
Polarization,76 PUB. OPINION Q. 405, 405 (2012).
134. Erza Klein & Alvin Chang, Political Identity Is Fair Game for Hatred: How
Republicans and Democrats Discriminate, VoX (Dec. 7, 2015, 8:00 AM), https://
www.vox.com/20 15/12/7/9790764/partisan-discrimination.
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Democrats in 1960).135 Perhaps more telling, 2017 research revealed that
"Americans are less likely to have the kind of interpersonal contact across
party lines that can dampen harsh beliefs about each other.
Neighborhoods, workplaces, households and even online dating lives
have become politically homogeneous." 136
In today's news media, the proliferation of cable television, the
internet, and the blogosphere has transformed public discourse. As a
result, "it is much easier than it once was to select media consistent with
one's ideology and to avoid a source whose message is opposed." 137
Correspondingly, national news now dominates; viewers and readers
rarely turn to local news outlets or local newspapers. 138 When Justice
Brennan made his 1977 appeal to state supreme courts, moderate-toliberal television and newspapers dominated public discourse 139 In the
age of party polarization, news that does not reinforce preexisting views
is deemed "fake news."
At the state level, polarization has grown over time-even though the
advent of red and blue states is largely a recent phenomenon. 140 Consider,
for example, abortion. Before 1990, there was no party divergence
between self-identified Republican and Democrats on abortion.141
Reviews of the General Social Surveys data show that Democrats and
Republicans held generally similar views at that time; in fact,
respondents who identified as Republican were more likely to identify as
pro-choice from 1972-87.142 1965-80 data likewise revealed that party
affiliation was a bad predictor of abortion attitudes; instead, the best
predictor was one's level of education. 143 When Justice Brennan made his

135.
AM),

Cass R. Sunstein, Partyism Now Trumps Racism, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 22, 2014, 8:03
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2014-09-22/partyism-now-trumps-racis

m.

136. Emily Badger & Niraj Chokshi, How We Became Bitter Political Enemies, N.Y.
TIMES (June 15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/15/upshot/how-we-became-bitterpolitical-enemies.html.
KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON & JOSEPH N. CAPELLA, ECHO CHAMBER:
137.
LIMBAUGH AND THE CONSERVATIVE MEDIA ESTABLISHMENT 216 (2008).

RUSH

138. See Dan Hopkins, All Politics Is National Because All Media Is National,
FIvETHIRTYEIGHT (June 6, 2018, 1:36 PM), https://fivethirtyeight.comlfeatures/all-politicsis-national-because-all-media-is-national/.
139. Lawrence Baum & Neal Devins, Why the Supreme Court Cares About Elites, Not
the American People, 98 GEO. L.J. 1515, 1543 (2010).
140. On the growth of polarization, see Boris Shor & Nolan McCarty, The Ideological
Mapping of American Legislatures, 105 AM. POL. Scl. REV. 530, 546-50 (2011).
141. Greg D. Adams, Abortion: Evidence ofan Issue Evolution, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 718,
724 (1997).
142.

Id.

143. Donald Granberg & Beth Wellsman Granberg, Abortion Attitudes, 1965-1980:
Trends and Determinants, 12 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 250, 254, 258 (1980).
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1977 plea to state courts, he was appealing to the dominant elite culture
of which both Democrats and Republicans were a part. At that time,
several studies pointed to a gap between elite and popular opinion on civil
rights and liberties: "Social learning, insofar as it affects support for civil
liberties, is likely to be greater among the influentials (that is, political
elites) of the society than among the mass public."1 4 4
State abortion politics backs up this account. From 1973-89, thirtythree states passed anti-abortion measures: the states that enacted the
most legislation included Illinois, North Dakota, Pennsylvania and Utah;
some of the states most supportive of Roe included Arkansas, Kansas,
New Hampshire. 145 Before 1990, moreover, there was broad consensus
among more than two-thirds of the American people and most state
lawmakers that waiting periods, informed consent, parental notification,
and some type of abortion facilities regulations were appropriate. 146
When the U.S. Supreme Court approved such provisions in its 1992
Planned Parenthood v. Casey decision, the Court was effectively
validating a package of laws that became a template for state lawmakers
over the next several years. 147 By 2010, however, there was no longer a
consensus and Republican and Democratic voters reflected national
party divisions on abortion. 148 Correspondingly, there was now a sharp
policy divide between red and blue states. 149
The fissure was such that blue and red state lawmakers each pushed
extreme versions of dominant party views. Blue states like Rhode Island,
New York, Maryland, and Massachusetts have either passed or are
pursuing legislation to remove abortion restrictions or protect abortion
access. 150 In New York, state lawmakers lifted a ban on most abortions

144. HERBERT MCCLOSKY & ALIDA BRILL, DIMENSIONS OF TOLERANCE: WHAT
AMERICANS BELIEVE ABOUT CIVIL LIBERTIES 233 (1983); see also Mark A. Graber, The

Coming Constitutional Yo-Yo? Elite Opinion, Polarization, and the Direction of Judicial
Decision Making, 56 HOw. L.J. 661, 684-86 (2013).
145. Glen Halva-Neubauer, Abortion Policy in the Post-Webster Age, 20 PUBLIUS 27, 3240 (1990).
146. See Neal Devins, How Planned Parenthood v. Casey (Pretty Much) Settled the
Abortion Wars, 118 YALE L.J. 1318, 1328 (2009).
147. 502 U.S. 1056 (1992); see Devins, supra note 146, at 1335-36.
148. See Neal Devins, Rethinking Judicial Minimalism: Abortion Politics, Party
Polarization, and the Consequences of Returning the Constitution to Elected Government,
69 VAND. L. REV. 935, 969-72 (2016).
149. For an insightful treatment of differences between red and blue state values, see
NAOMI CAHN & JUNE CARBORNE, RED FAMILIES V. BLUE FAMILIES: LEGAL POLARIZATION
AND THE CREATION OF CULTURE 1, 2, 62-63 (2011).
150. See Anna North, Roe v. Wade Is at Risk, but Abortion Rights Groups See
Opportunities for Gains, VOx (Jan. 24. 2019), https://www.vox.com/2019/1/22/18186582/
abortion-new-york-laws-2019-roe-wade; Sabrina Tavernise, "Te Time is Now"` States Are
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after 24 weeks.15 1 For their part, red state lawmakers enacted
increasingly draconian restrictions. These laws included mandatory
ultrasounds, laws prohibiting abortions after a fetal heartbeat is
detectable, laws mandating that abortion providers have hospital
admitting privileges, and laws requiring that abortion clinics also be
ambulatory surgical facilities. 152 From January to May 2019, seven states
passed heartbeat laws (effectively banning abortion after six to eight
weeks of pregnancy) and Alabama banned all abortions. 153 In Part IV, I
will discuss and evaluate recent state supreme court decision-making on
abortion. At this point, I want to flag the obvious-most of us live in a
red/blue state world where the political establishments and voters of red
and blue states are increasingly homogeneous and increasingly willing to
push the agenda of their party.

B.

Party Polarization'sImpact on State Supreme Court DecisionMaking

Let me turn now to my key claims as to why state supreme courts are
less apt to be pathbreakers in the age of party polarization. First, in this
era of McPolitics, the gravitational pull of federal norms is stronger now
than ever before. All politics is now national and, correspondingly, there
is more interest in federal than state courts. Second, polarization
exacerbates backlash risks. National interest groups, for example, are
increasingly involved in state judicial elections and in prodding
legislatures to adjust judicial selection and retention schemes. Third, red
and blue state supreme court justices are likely to agree with red and
blue state lawmakers and governors. In other words, there are fewer
states now than before where the legal policy preferences of state
supreme courts vary from elected officials. Those purple states are
certainly important but the number of states likely to disapprove of
elected government decision-making is smaller now than ever before.

Rushing to Restrict Abortion, or to Protect It, N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2019), https://
www.nytimes.com/2019/05/15/us/abortion-laws-2019.html.
151. Tom Precious, Long Stalled Abortion Bill Passes in New York Legislature, BUFFALO
NEWS (Jan. 22, 2019), https:/Ibuffalonews.com/2019/01/22/long-stalled-abortion-bill-passesnew-york-legislaturel.
152. Devins, supra note 148, at 969, 976, 977 n.231.
153. Tavernise, supra note 150; Mitch Smith, Missouri Governor Signs Law Outlawing
Abortion After Eight Weeks, N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/
24/us/missouri-abortion-law.html.
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Federal Norms

The gravitational pull of federal norms is stronger now than ever
before. State officials and voters increasingly situate state politics
against the broader backdrop of national politics. Democratic and
Republican candidates offer essentially the same political platform with
little variation based on local preferences.154 In recent years, "[v]oters in
state races are driven by their national partisan identity." 15 The results
in gubernatorial elections have begun mirroring presidential elections,
and votes for state legislators have increasingly become expressions of
"voter preferences about national elections."156 In a 2018 advertisement
for New York State Senate primary races, the actor Edie Falco was
enlisted to encourage voters to elect Democrats so that New York State
could pass protective legislation to "resist Trump's agenda."15 7
Correspondingly, state constitutional arguments hold less appeal-even
when they can be enlisted to advance national legal policy objectives.
Two anecdotes from my home state, Virginia, vividly illustrate this
point. In January 2018, I attended the State of the State Address of justelected Virginia Governor Ralph Northam. I had never listened to-let
alone attended-a State of the State Address, and so I anticipated that
the speech would be Virginia-focused. My expectations could not have
been further off the mark. The principal targets of the Governor's address
were national in nature-the Affordable Care Act, gun control, abortion,
and a slew of reforms to either expand voting rights or make it easier to
register to vote or cast an absentee ballot. 158 It is only slightly hyperbolic
to say that the Governor's speech was so unmoored to Virginia-specific
issues that it could have been delivered in any state or on Capitol Hill.
The second anecdote is far more important (at least for this paper).
In January 2014, Virginia Attorney General Mark Herring announced
that he would not defend the state ban on same-sex marriage and,
instead, would argue in court that the law violated the Federal
Constitution. For Herring, "[t]oo many times" Virginia had been on the

154. See Mounk, supra note 117.
155. Jessica Bulman-Pozen, States of the Union, HARV. L. REV. BLOG (Oct. 17, 2018),
https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/states-of-the-union/.
156. David N. Schleicher, Federalism Is in a Bad State, HARV. L. REV. BLOG (Oct. 12,
2018), https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/federalism-is-in-a-bad-state/; Dan Hopkins, All
Politics Is Presidential, FIVETHiRTYEIGHT (Mar. 17, 2014), https://fivethirtyeight.com/
features/all-politics-is-presidentiall.
157. Bulman-Pozen, supra note 155.
158. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA ADDRESS OF GOVERNOR RALPH S. NORTHAM, THE
STATE OF THE COMMONWEALTH ADDRESS TO THE JOINT ASSEMBLY, S. Doc. No. 1C, at 5, 78 (2018).
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"wrong side" of justice on civil rights matters. 159 "It is time for the
commonwealth to be on the right side of history." 160 This nationalistic
rhetoric is striking. Herring did not consider the possibility that the state
ban violated the Virginia Constitution or otherwise reference state law
concerns. Correspondingly, when formally changing the state's legal
position in ongoing federal court litigation, Herring referenced his oath
to support "the Constitution of the United States" and his related
conclusion that "he is not duty bound to defend" state law at variance
with "his independent constitutional judgment" of the Federal
Constitution.16 1 His filing did not reference a related statutory provision
allowing the Governor to step in for the Attorney General and defend
state law when the Attorney General certifies that "there is a conflict of
62
interests or that he is unable to render certain legal services."1
Herring's seeming indifference to the potential relevance of state law
typifies state attorney general behavior on the duty to defend issue. In
2015, Sai Prakash and I published an article on state attorney general
refusals to defend state law in court. 163 Sai and I found that refusals to
defend were increasingly tied to federal, not state, constitutional
arguments. 164 Of the twelve state attorneys general who refused to
defend state bans on same-sex marriage, only one (New Mexico) explicitly
relied on state constitutional arguments. 165 The fact that the right to
same-sex marriage was earlier propelled by state supreme court
interpretations of state constitutions did not matter. 166 State attorneys
general were playing on a national stage, making national arguments.
Indeed, the related fight over the Power of state attorneys general to
refuse to defend was likewise framed in absolutist, nationalistic terms.
The Republican Attorney General Association argued that claims-like
159. Timothy Williams & Trip Gabriel, Virginia's New Attorney General Opposes Ban on
Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/24/us/newvirginia-attorney-general-drops-defense-of-gay- marriage-ban.html.
160. Id.
161. Memorandum of Defendant Janet M. Rainey in Support of Change in Legal Position
at 1-2, Bostic v. Rainey, No. 2:13-cv-00395 (E.D.V.A. Jan. 23, 2014).
162. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-510 (West 2014); see Rainey, supra note 161.
163. Neal Devins & Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Fifty States, Fifty Attorneys General,
and Fifty Approaches to the Duty to Defend, 124 YALE L.J. 2100, 2102 (2015).
164. See id. app. II at 2178-87.
165. Greigo v. Oliver, 316 P.3d 865, 889 (N.M. 2013); Devins & Prakash, supra note 163,
at 2139.
166. Nine of these twelve cases were filed in federal court. Devins & Prakash, supra note
163, at 2139. Nonetheless, state attorneys general could still have asserted that the law
was unconstitutional on state constitutional grounds. Id. at 2116-18. For a related
argument, see Hans A. Linde, E Pluribus- Constitutional Theory and State Courts, 18 GA.
L. REV. 165, 178 (1984) (arguing that state courts should initially address state law claims
before considering federal law claims).
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Herring's- that state attorneys general could refuse to defend based on
independent analysis were "inappropriate" and "unprecedented." 167 For
their part, Democratic attorneys general argued that gauging the
constitutionality of state law and refusing to defend "is something that's
appropriate for an attorney general to do."168 Neither side made any
effort to delve deeply into the specific language of state statutes and state
constitutional provisions.16 9
This failure to take state law into account is striking but
understandable. Attorneys general are politically ambitious and-like
other politicians-have incentive to win favor with voters, donors, and
party leaders. 170 Indeed, forty-three are popularly elected and 37% of
attorneys general subsequently run for higher office, such as governor
(26%) or senator (10%).171 These attorneys general use high profile
litigation to enhance future political prospects. 172 In today's era of
hyperpolarized politics and the related convergence of federal and state
politics, it is to be expected that Democratic and Republican attorneys
general would embrace high profile nationally-oriented litigation to

167. Tal Kopan, GOP AGs: Holder 'Inappropriate',POLITICO (Feb. 25, 2014, 4:21 PM),
https://www.politico.com/story/2014/02/eric-holder-republican-state-attorneys-general- 103
940.
168. Matt Apuzzo, Holder Sees Way to Curb Bans on Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24,
2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/25/us/holder-says-state-attorneys-general-donthave-to-defend-gay-marriage-bans.html.
169. For reasons that Sai and I detail, specific state law provisions define the scope of
attorney general autonomy (not the largely ceremonial oath that all attorneys general take
to support and defend the federal and state constitutions). See Devins & Prakash, supra
note 163, at 2130-34.
170. In today's era of McPolitics, the gravitational pull of federal norms is such that state
lawmakers frequently enact model legislation that is being pursued by like-minded
lawmakers in other states. See Model Politics, AM. LEGIs. EXCHANGE COUNCIL, http://
www.aled.org/model/policy (last visited Sept. 18, 2019). In some instances (abortion most
notably), Democrats and Republicans embrace competing model legislation. Compare Molly
Jackman, ALEC's Influence over Lawmaking in State Legislatures, BROOKINGS (Dec. 6,
2013), https://www.brookings.edularticles/alecs-influence-over-lawmaking-in-state-legisla
tures/, with Kenneth P. Vogel, Democrats CreateALEC-Killer, POLITICO (Nov. 9, 2014, 9:55
For
PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2014/11/democrats-create-an-alec-killer-112733.
many Republicans, this legislation is designed to tee up a federal constitutional case-so
that state lawmakers are thinking more about federal than state constitutional issues.
Jenny Jarvie, Conservative States Enact Abortion Bans in Hope of Overturning Roe vs.
Wade, L.A. TIMES (May 11, 2019, 6:37 PM), https://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-abortionbans-states-roe-wade-supreme-court-20190511-story.html.
171. Colin Provost, When Is AG Short for Aspiring Governor? Ambition and
Policymaking Dynamics in the Office of State Attorney General, 40 PUBLIUS 597, 599, 604
(2009); William N. Thompson, Should We Elect or Appoint State Government Executives?
Some New Data ConcerningState Attorneys General, 8 AM. REV. PUB. ADMIN. REV. 17, 17,
30 (1974).
172. See Provost, supra note 171, at 612.
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enhance their status among their constituents and also bolster future
political prospects. 173 The same-sex marriage litigation is an illustration
of this, as are efforts by competing coalitions of Republican and
Democratic attorneys general to challenge opposition party presidents.
Republican attorneys general famously sued the Obama Administration
over the Affordable Care Act and the President's. immigration
initiatives.1 74 For their part, Democratic attorneys general have pursued
(as of April 2019) seventy-one lawsuits against the Trump
administration, regarding sanctuary cities, the Emoluments Clause, the
Affordable Care Act, the President's immigration initiatives, and much
more. 175
Two other phenomena explain why state attorneys general are not
pursuing important state constitutional cases in state court. One is the
growth of nationwide Democratic and Republican Attorney General
Associations; the other is the rise of state solicitors general. 176 The
Democratic Attorneys General Association ("DAGA") website and
aggressive emailing campaigns both emphasize their efforts to undo
Trump and the necessity of contributing to DAGA to achieve that
objective. 17 7 For its part, the Republican Attorneys General Association
touts its role in advancing Trump policies and seeks funds to elect
Republican attorneys general for that purpose. 178 Specifically:
"Republican AGs are actively working with the administration to restore
the rule of law and correct other previous unconstitutional
overreaches." 179
173. For this very reason, state attorneys general have not sought to advance their legal
policy objectives through their "common law" power to file lawsuits in state court alleging
that state law violates state constitutional provisions.. See Devins & Prakash, supra note
163, 2125-26 (discussing state attorneys general common law power); see also State ex rel.
Salazar v. Davidson, 79 P.3d 1221, 1230 (Colo. 2003).
174. Emma Platoff, Texas and 6 Other States Sue to End DACA, TEX. TRIBUNE (May 1,
2018), https://www.texastribune.org/2018/05/0 1/texas-and-six-other-states-sue-end-daca/;
Mattie Quinn, Does the Obamacare Case Represent a New Norm for States?, GOVERNING
(Jan. 22, 2019), https://www.governing.com/topics/health-human-services/gov-obamacarelawsuit-state-attorney-general.html.
175. Maureen Groppe, Multistate Lawsuits Against Trump in 2 Years Exceed Those
Against Obama, Bush in 8 Years, USA TODAY (Apr. 10, 2019), https://www.usatoday.com/
story/news/politics/2019/04/1 0/donald-trump-sued-more-often-democratic-attorneys-gener
al/3143366002/.
176. On the rise of state solicitors general, see Banks Miller, Describing the State
Solicitors General, 93 JUDICATURE 238, 242-43 (May-June 2010).
177. See DemocraticAGs Continue to Stand up to Trump and Protect the People and the
Environment, DEMOCRATIC ATTORNEYS GEN. ASSOCIATION, https://democraticags.org/demags-last-24hrs-aug/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2019).
178. About RAGA, REPUBLICAN ATT'Ys GEN. Ass'N, https://www.republicanags.com/
about/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2019).
179. Id.
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The nationalization of attorneys general, including the push towards
high visibility federal court litigation, has also been fueled by the rise of
state solicitors general. Before 1987, eight states had solicitors general;
by 2001, the number had risen to twenty-four; today, thirty-nine states
have solicitors general.so Most state solicitors general have clerked for
federal court judges, with several having clerked for U.S. Supreme Court
Justices; some are law professors and some come from large firm
appellate practices.181 Perhaps more importantly, after serving a stint as
state solicitor generals, these lawyers typically focus their energies on
federal appellate practice-some practice in large firms (often heading
federal appellate groups), some return to the academy, and some go on to
federal judgeships. 182 Prominent members of this club (all of whom are
now federal appeals judges or U.S. Senators and all of whom have argued
before the U.S. Supreme Court when state solicitors general) include Jeff
Sutton, Eric Murphy, James Ho, Ted Cruz, and Kevin Newsom.18 3
The professional ambitions of state solicitors general revolve around
high visibility federal court litigation. These appellate specialists
typically have a federal law background and pursue federal law careers
after their stint as state solicitor general. They are drawn to the position
specifically because it promises them the opportunity to participate in
high visibility federal court litigation, including the regular filing of
briefs and (for several) the presentation of oral arguments before the U.S.
Supreme Court. State solicitors general, for example, litigated challenges
to Obama and Trump immigration initiatives as well as the legality of
the U.S. citizen question on the Census. 184
For state officials and voters, all politics is national. The increasing
focus on federal litigation is certainly tied to his phenomena, especially
state lawsuits challenging or defending presidential initiatives (for the
President stands at the epicenter of all that is national). This pattern

180. See James R. Layton, The Evolving Role of the State Solicitor: Toward the Federal
Model, 3 J. App. PRAC. & PROCESS 534, 534 (2001); Miller, supra note 176, at 238; The
Federalist Society, The Role of State Solicitors General [POLICYbrief], at 2:40, YOUTUBE
(May 2, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v-OCFD5Rucl3s.
181. See Miller, supra note 176, at 239.
182. See id. at 241.
183. See Eric Murphy, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/EricMurphy (last visited
Sept. 18, 2019); James Ho, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/JamesHo (last visited
Sept. 18, 2019); Jeffrey Sutton, BALLOTPEDIA, https:/Iballotpedia.org/JeffreySutton (last
visited Sept. 18, 2019); Kevin Newsom, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/
KevinNewsom (last visited Sept. 18, 2019); Ted Cruz, BALLOTPEDIA, https://
ballotpedia.org/TedCruz (last visited Sept. 18, 2019).
184. See Platoff, supra note 174; Adam Liptak, On Census Citizenship Question,
Supreme Court's Conservatives Appear United, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2019), https://
www.nytimes.com/2019/04/23/us/politics/supreme-court-census-citizenship.html.
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shows no sign of abating and until then the focus of interest groups, state
attorneys and solicitors general, and all others are tied to federal law.
State constitutional law is diminished, if not irrelevant; for what happens
in one state can inform other states and (theoretically) the U.S. Supreme
Court. 185

2.

Backlash Risks

The increasing prominence of federal law and federal norms has also
shifted the focus of state law developments. The decisions of state
supreme courts and, relatedly, the election of state justices is now looked
at through a national prism. For example, as is true of elections for other
state officials, state judicial elections have become microcosms of
national elections. Correspondingly, national interest groups are
increasingly important players in state judicial elections.186 For their
part, state justices turn to out-of-state interests for campaign
contributions and, not surprisingly, these contributions are linked to
rulings that back the views of campaign contributors. 187 State justices,
moreover, are both increasingly interested in national legal policy when
running for office and increasingly aware of the risks of upsetting
national interest groups.
"[E]1ected state judges ignore powerful political pressures at their
peril. They need to be-and likely are in reality-more closely attuned to
the connection between legal judgments and political ramifications." 188
Starting in the 1990s, contested judicial elections began to reflect "the
rise in campaign spending, interest group activity, partisan rancor, and
political speech." 189 This "radicalization of judicial elections has increased
the expected penalty to the judge who contravenes the majority will." 190
In today's hyper-polarized world, state politics is national politics. Most
185. On the influence of state courts on the U.S. Supreme Court, see Sutton, supra note
3, at 796-97. On the interface between state supreme courts, see Neal Devins, Same-Sex
Marriageand the New JudicialFederalism: Why State CourtsShould Not Consider Out-ofState Backlash, in NEW FRONTIERS OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: DUAL ENFORCEMENT OF
NORMS 81, 83 (James A. Gardner & Jim Rossi eds., 2010).
186. See, e.g., Pozen, supra note 45, at 93; ALICIA BANNON ET AL., WHO PAYS FOR
JUDICIAL RACES?: THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2015-16, at 8 (2017), https://
www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/Politics-ofJudicial-ElectionsFin
al.pdf.
187. See Michael S. Kang & Joanna M. Shepherd, The Partisan Price of Justice: An
EmpiricalAnalysis of Campaign Contributionsand JudicialDecisions, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV.
69, 102 (2011).
188. Daniel B. Rodriguez, Change that Matters: An Essay on State Constitutional
Development, 115 PA. ST. L. REV. 1073, 1074 (2011).
189. Pozen, supra note 80, at 307; see also Pozen, supra note 45, at 93-94.
190. Pozen, supra note 80, at 327.
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campaign contributions now come from outside candidates' districts. 191
Correspondingly, state judicial elections turn more on national issues,
and national interest groups are more directly involved in backing
favored or attacking disfavored judicial candidates.
In states with contested elections, candidates overtly embrace
national party politics in order to gain advantage with nationally
oriented voters. For instance, a 2012 Republican candidate for the Texas
Supreme Court, Don Willet, ran an advertisement touting himself as "the
judicial remedy to Obamacare." 192 In 2018, a Democratic candidate for
the Michigan Supreme Court, Sam Bagenstos, enlisted Elizabeth Warren
to campaign for him and promised voters he would resist the Trump
agenda. 193 Likewise in 2018, the Democratic candidate for Wisconsin
Supreme Court, Rebecca Dallet, both ran advertisements directly
attacking President Trump and received high profile endorsements from
Eric Holder and Joe Biden. 194 Her Republican opponent, Michael
Scernock, received support from Americans for Prosperity. 195
This nationalizing of state judicial politics often cuts against
expansive state court interpretations of state constitutions. State
supreme court justices are particularly wary of running afoul of national
interest groups on national issues. One of those issues is expanding the
boundaries of individual rights protections beyond the U.S. Supreme
Court. Voters and interest groups will not draw a line separating state
from federal decision-making; instead, they will pay attention to the
bottom line, and that bottom line-in today's era of McPolitics-is set by

191. Harry Stevens & Alexi McMammond, Most Campaign Contributions Come from
Outside Candidates' Districts, AXIos, https://www.axios.com/house-campaign-contrib
utions-outside-money-f776be9e-f74b-4834-8ff4-ae30dflf7c6 1. html (last updated Aug. 28,
2018).
192. See Alicia Bannon, Rethinking Judicial Selection in State Courts, BRENNAN CTR.
FOR JUST. 1, 11 (2016), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/
RethinkingJudicialSelectionState-Courts.pdf. Willet's appeal to national politics paid
off in many ways, including a 2017 Fifth Circuit nomination by President Trump and
making then-candidate Trump's 2016 short list of potential Supreme Court nominees. See
Edith Roberts, Potential Nominee Profile: Don Willet, SCOTUS BLOG (June 29, 2018),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/06/potential-nominee-profile-don-willett/.
193. See Endorsements, SAMUEL BAGENSTOS FOR MICHIGAN SUP. CT., https://
www.bagenstosforjustice.comlendorsements (last visited Sept. 13, 2019).
194. Monica Davey, Liberal Judge Wins Wisconsin Supreme Court Seat, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 3,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/03/us/wisconsin-election-supremecourt.html; Ed Kilgore, Wisconsin's Supreme Court Election Is Going to Be a Barnburner,
N.Y. MAG. (Apr. 1, 2018), http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/04/wis-supreme-courtelection-is-going-to-be-a-barnburner.html; Judge Rebecca Dallet: Standing up for Your
Rights, YOUTUBE, (Jan. 29, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T5j05Ha2UqY&fea
ture=youtu.be.
195. See Kilgore, supra note 194.
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U.S. Supreme Court interpretations of the Federal Constitution.
Consequently, unless state voters and the state political establishment
back rights-expanding decision-making, 196 state supreme court justices
have reason to steer clear of controversy.
The 2010 ousting of three Iowa Supreme Court Justices for their
same-sex marriage votes highlights the role of national interest groups
and the related need for state justices to see state voter opinion as tied
both to these groups and the national policy positions of Democrats and
Republicans. As discussed, the Iowa political establishment did not resist
the same-sex matriage ruling and not- one Iowa justice had ever been
unseated in a retention election.1 97 However, the Family Research
Council, the American Families Association, Citizens United, and the
National Organization for Marriage wanted to send a message to Iowa
and courts beyond. 198 As David Pozen wrote: "The campaign was
conservative in its resistance to judicial creativity and legal change....
Its goal was to homogenize U.S. constitutional practice by bringing an
99
In
outlier state back into line with the prevailing sociolegal norm."1
claims
about
Sutton's
to
Judge
contravention
in
direct
other words (and
state courts as laboratories), "certain types of constitutional competition
200
within states can depress constitutional competition among states."
Recent studies regarding the impact of national groups on judicial
elections and recent state efforts to limit merit selection plans are
particularly instructive here. These studies call attention to the role of
outside money in state judicial elections. 201 Lawyer groups, lobbyists, and
business interests, for example, invested several millions of dollars in
2015 state supreme court races in Pennsylvania and a 2016 state
supreme court race in North Carolina. 202 These studies also highlight
growing backlash risks for state justices who provide for rights

196. In today's hyper-polarized political environment, federalism has arguably morphed
into a way for the out party to hide out in states while it is out of power nationally. See
Jessica Bulman-Pozen, PartisanFederalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1077, 1089-93 (2014). In
states where the out party dominates, state voters and state political leaders may
sometimes look to state courts to play a leadership role. Id. In the age of party polarization,
where Republicans now control the White House and the Senate for example, blue state
Democrats might sometimes look to state courts to advance the out-party political agenda.
This arguably happened in Washington State when the state supreme court abolished the
death penalty. See infra text accompanying notes 236-39. Thanks to Jim Gardner for
making this point to me.
197. See supra text accompanying note 44.
198. Pozen, supra note 45, at 98 n.43.
199. Id. at 98.
200. Id.
201. See, e.g., BANNON ET AL., supra note 186, at 14; Bannon, supra note 192.
202. See BANNON ET AL., supra note 186, at 11-12, 14-15, 18.
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Supreme Court
U.S.
those protected by
protections beyond
interpretations of the Federal Constitution. 203 In today's polarized world,
retention races are increasingly contested, and state officials are willing
to rethink structural protections afforded state justices. A 2017 study by
the Brennan Center argued that national groups spent over $20 million
on television advertisements in the 2015-16 elections cycle, funding 73%
of negative television ads. 20 4 According to research by Michael Kang and
Joanna Shepherd, these attack ads have impacted judicial decisions,
most notably, leading to a hostility to criminal defendants in state
supreme court appeals decisions. 205
State legislatures-sometimes in conjunction with national interest
groups-are also taking steps to subject judges to greater political
controls through structural reforms. Following the 2016 Democratic
takeover of the North Carolina governorship, outgoing governor, Pat
206
In
McCrory, approved fundamental changes to state judicial elections.
the
an effort to bolster Republican control of the state supreme court,
Legislature approved a measure that returns partisan primaries to
elections for the state's supreme court.207 According to the Brennan
Center, over the course of 2018, eighteen states considered sixty bills
"that would have politicized or undermined the independence of state
8
These bills would make judicial selection more partisan,
courts."20
weaken or eliminate judicial nominating commissions, shield certain
legislative action from judicial review, alter judicial term lengths, and
change the size of the courts. 209 Perhaps most significant (for state
supreme courts), several states are seeking to limit merit selection plans
in order to make state supreme courts more responsive to the state's
political establishment. 2 1 0 These selection plans are intended to
depoliticize judicial selections by having state bar associations play a
critical role in identifying judges, including state supreme court

203. See supratext accompanying notes 73-74.
204. See BANNON ETAL., supranote 186, at 32, 35.
205. Michael S. Kang & Joanna M. Shepherd, Judging JudicialElections, 114 MICH. L.
REV. 929, 930 (2016).
206. See Ann Blythe, NC Lawmakers Create PartisanElection Process for Courts that
Review their Laws, NEWS & OBSERVER (Dec. 16. 2016), https://www.newsobserver.com/

news/politics-government/state-politics/articlel21449157.html.
207. See id.
208. Legislative Assaults on State Courts - 2019, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Feb. 11,
2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/legislative-assaults-state

-courts-2019.
209. Id.
210. Id.
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justices. 211 In 2017 and 2018, proposals have been made to do away with
merit selection in six of the sixteen states with merit plans; two other
states with merit plans have seen proposals allowing for legislative
review of judicial decisions and stripping the state courts of jurisdiction
in school finance cases. 212 In May 2019, Iowa changed its judicial
selection law in the wake of Republican complaints about the Iowa
Supreme Court finding a right to abortion in the Iowa Constitution. 213
Against this backdrop, it is 1ittle wonder that state supreme court
justices would be careful not to run afoul of either national interest group
preferences or the national agenda of whichever political party controls
the state. In today's polarized age, partisan attacks-particularly by outof-state interests-are more likely than ever before. In today's polarized
age, state judicial candidates increasingly turn to out-of-state money. In
today's polarized age, there is little incentive to push constitutional
boundaries beyond those recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court;
lockstepping, instead, may prove the best way to obviate potential
political risks.
3.

The Rise of Shared Preferences Among State Courts and
Elected State Officials

Party polarization results in less issue space for state courts to
expand their constitutions to protect individual rights. In both red and
blue states, there is likely to be agreement among all political leadersthe governor, attorney general, and state legislature. In these states,
state supreme court just-ices are likely to come from the dominant
political party and likely to agree with the political establishment.
There will be exceptions as the state political establishment may act
in ways that are overtly unconstitutional or the state may make use of a
merit selection plan that results in bar groups playing a meaningful role

211. Id. For a critique of these claims about bar association neutrality, see Brian T.
Fitzpatrick, The Politicsof Merit Selection, 74 MO. L. REV. 675 (2009).
212. See Legislative Assault on State Courts - 2018, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Feb. 7,
2018), https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/legislative-assaults-state-courts-2018.
213. See infra text accompanying notes 260-61. See generally Katarina Sostaric, Iowa
Governor Signs Judicial Selection Changes into Law, IOWA PUBLIc RADIO (May 8, 2019),
https://www.iowapublicradio.org/post/iowa-governor-signs-judicial-selection-changeslaw#stream/0. For a discussion of a similar but failed effort in Oklahoma (following a state
supreme court ruling on abortion), see Joseph P. Williams, JudicialReforms Aim at Making
Courts More Partisan,Less Powerful, U.S. NEWS (Feb. 14, 2018), https://www.usnews.com/
news/politics/articles/2018-02- 14/judicial-reforms-aim-at- making-courts-more-partisanless-powerful.
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in the selection of state supreme court justices. 214 Nonetheless, especially
with respect to the twenty-two states that select justices through
competitive elections, state courts and state political actors are likely to
be in sync. 215 A 2014 study by Adam Bonica and Michael J. Woodruff
backs up this commonsense proposition: "[S]tate Supreme Courts exhibit
a pattern of ideological sorting similar to trends that have been noted
elsewhere in American politics. As the population of justices polarized
across states over the past two decades, individual state courts became
more homogeneous." 216 In other words, state supreme court justices in
polarized times tend to converge on the dominant ideology of other
political actors.
In a less polarized time, the red-blue state divide would be less
consequential and less prevalent. It would be less consequential because
party identity and ideology would not be aligned; instead, Republicans
and Democrats would each be represented in all ideological niches. It
would be less prevalent for the same reason--conservative voters would
support conservative Democrats and liberal voters would back liberal
Republicans. Before 2008, most states had divided government (where
the governor and the two houses of the state legislature were not all of
the same party). 217 Leading up to the 2012 election, there were thirtythree states where Democrats or Republicans controlled the state's
legislative and executive branches; in 2018, there were thirty-six such
states. 218 As states become more polarized, it has become increasingly
unlikely for a state's legislative and executive branches to have different
philosophical outlooks. 219

214. For further discussion of the relevance of merit selection plans creating a
disjunction between the state judiciary and the state political establishment, see supratext
accompanying notes 210-13.
215. Bonica & Woodruff, supranote 116.
216. Id.
217. See Geoff Pallay, Who Runs the States?, BALLOTPEDIA 8-9 (May 2013), https://
cdn.ballotpedia.org/images/c/ca/WhoRunstheStatesPartiPartisanship.pdf.
218. See Gubernatorial and Legislative Party Control of State Government,
BALLOTPEDIA, https:/Iballotpedia.org/Gubernatorial-andlegislative-partycontrolofstat
e-government (last visited Sept. 18, 2019).
219. Louisiana and Maryland are notable exceptions to this increasingly dominant
pattern. See Erin Cox, Maryland Gov. Larry Hogan Backs Gun-Control Measures, Money
for School Security, BALTIMORE SUN (Feb. 28, 2018), https://www.baltimoresun.com/politics/
Lydia Saad, Conservative-Leaning
bs-md-gun-control-proposals-20180227-story.html;
States Drop from 44 to 39, GALLUP (Feb. 6, 2018), https://news.gallup.com/poll/226730/
conservative-leaning-states-drop.aspx. Moreover, it is sometimes the case that a state with
divided government is either a red or a blue state because the values of one or the other
party are dominant. In 2019, for example, red state Louisiana has an avidly pro-life
Democratic governor and blue state Maryland has a pro-choice, pro-gun control Republican
governor. Tyler Bridges, Anti-Abortion Stance Puts Louisiana Gov. John Bel Edwards at
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In the age of party polarization, however, there will be fairly few
cases in red and blue states where the state supreme court and the
dominant political coalition will be out of sync with each other. With the
notable exception of state supreme court justices appointed through a
merit selection, process, 220 red and blue state justices will likely reflect
state political norms. In these states, there will be few cases where state
supreme courts will want to slap down the dominant political party
through expansive interpretations of state constitutions. In states where
voters favor the expansion of rights, state lawmakers are likely to enact
and the governor likely to sign rights-expanding legislation--so that
state supreme courts will have fewer opportunities to fill the void in these
states. 221 In states where voters do not want to expand rights, there will
be an opportunity for the state courts to act but-in politically
homogeneous states-elected judges are likely to agree with the
prevailing political wisdom.
Today, the states where there is likely to be a disjunction between
the legal policy preferences of state supreme court justices and state
lawmakers and governors are purple states-states where the supreme
court reflects the political beliefs of one party and where state lawmakers
and governors are from the opposition party. 222 In my 2015 paper with
Sai Prakash on state attorney general refusals to defend state law, we
223
examined a similar phenomenon involving same-sex marriage.
Controversies over state attorney general refusals to defend came from
twelve purple states. 224 "In deep red and blue states," we wrote, "the risks
of controversy are mitigated by the fact that one party dominates the

Odds with Much of Democratic Base, THE ADVOCATE (June 1, 2019, 8:48 PM), https://
www.theadvocate.com/baton-rouge/news/politics/legislature/article-d970cbd-8486-1 1e9bb8a-cf565198aalf.html; Cox, supra note 219; see Maureen Shaw, Maryland Governor
Takes Atypical GOPApproachto Reproductive Rights, REWIRE NEWS (Apr. 26, 2017), https:/
/rewire.news/article/2 017/04/26/maryland-governor-takes-atypical-gop-approach-reproduc
tive-rights/.
220. For a discussion on the important role that merit selection plays in explaining those
instances where state supreme courts reject prevailing state political norms, see supra
Section III.B.2.
221.

See GARY MONCRIEF & PEVERILL SQUIRE, WHY STATES MATIER: AN INTRODUCTION

TO STATE POLITICS 97-98 (2013). On rare occasions, state supreme courts will invalidate
laws that have fallen out of favor with the dominant state political establishment. For an
examination of recent instances where state supreme courts invalidated legislation
disfavored by the state political establishment, see infra text accompanying notes 256-84.
222. This definition of purple state fits this Article but is not the classic definitionwhere the focus is a mismatch between either lawmakers and the governor or a mismatch
between the two houses of the state legislature. See Devins & Prakash, supra note 163, at
2106, 2152.
223. Id. at 2102.
224. Id. at 2141.
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political branch[es].

. . . On same-sex marriage, blue states either
voluntarily repealed prohibitions on same-sex marriage or acquiesced to
court orders striking down the same-sex marriage bans. Because red
state voters generally back these bans, their elected politicians tend to
support them as well." 225
In addition to purple state justices, justices appointed through merit
selection plans
sometimes disagree with
the
state political
establishment. By empowering state bar groups in judicial selection,
these plans seek to insulate state justices from politics and often place a
premium on a nominee's reputation among the state's legal elite. 226 At
the same time, state bars in red and blue states tend to reflect the
prevailing legal policy views of elected officials. 227 In other words, even in
states with merit selection plans, policy disagreements are most likely to
occur in purple states. 228
For state supreme court justices in merit selection and/or purple
states, there is great risk in ruling against the political branches. 229 State
supreme court justices, for reasons discussed, are reluctant to take this
risk. Sometimes they do, of course. In Part IV, I will examine some recent
examples-particularly with respect to Trump-era rulings on abortion
and districting. For reasons I will now detail, these rulings are not
counterexamples to the claims made in this Article. They highlight both
that purple state justices (typically appointed through a merit selection
plan) are the ones most likely to rule against elected government; they
also highlight that victories in state supreme courts are often pyrrhic.
State officials can seek to undermine these rulings or otherwise subject
state justices to democratic controls; this is particularly true with respect
to the sixteen states that make use of merit selection plans.

IV. STATE CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE AGE OF PARTY POLARIZATION

Since the 2016 election of Donald Trump, state supreme courts have
issued important state constitutional rulings protecting individual
the
death
penalty
decisions
suspending
rights,
including

225. Id. at 2152-53.
226. TARR, supra note 34, at 63-65.
227. See Adam Bonica et al., The Political Ideologies of American Lawyers, 8 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS 277, 298 (2016).
228. See infra text accompanying notes 248-56 (highlighting the relevance of merit
selection plans to the willingness of four state supreme courts to recognize abortion rights
and strike down state abortion regulations).
229. On same-sex marriage, for example, ten of the twelve judges were subject to
contested (two) or retention (eight) election in states where attorneys general refused to
defend. See Devins & Prakash, supra note 163, at 2151-53, app. II at 2178-87.
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(Washington), 230 recognizing the free speech rights of businesses
(Arizona),231 repudiating partisan gerrymandering (Pennsylvania),232
and rejecting state abortion regulations (Alaska, Florida, Iowa, and
Kansas). 233 A panel of North Carolina court judges also repudiated
partisan gerrymandering in September 2019 and that decision was not
appealed "probably because the North Carolina Supreme Court has a 61 Democratic majority." 234 These decisions call attention to the
continuing importance of state supreme courts. Upon closer examination,
however, they also reinforce the central claims of this article. Specifically,
these decisions either ratified dominant state political norms (where
there were next-to-no backlash risks), were made by purple state justices
whose political leanings did not match state lawmakers, or were made by
justices appointed in a merit-selection plan (often chosen by purple state
governors whose political leanings were at variance with the state
legislatures). Moreover, these decisions call attention to the risks state
justices face when they negate elected government preferences. In
Washington and Arizona, the state supreme court reinforced dominant
statewide political preferences. In all other states but North Carolina,
elected officials took aim at these decisions-making changes to the rules
governing state judicial selection/retention, appointing new justices
whose political leanings better matched the views of elected officials,
pursuing constitutional amendment overrides, and threatening
impeachment proceedings. In North Carolina, legislative retribution
seemed futile in the face of a just-elected Democratic governor and 201516 legislative battles (where a Republican governor worked with
Republican lawmakers to preemptively neuter future Democratic control
of the state supreme court). 235 In short, 2017-19 rulings underscore the

230. State v. Gregory, 427 P.3d 621, 626-27, 642 (Wash. 2018).
231. Brush & Nib Studio, LC v. City of Phoenix, No. CV-18-0176-PR (Ariz. Sept. 16,
2019).
232. League of Women Voters v. Commonwealth, 178 A.3d 737, 821 (Pa. 2018).
233. See State v. Planned Parenthood of the Great Nw., 436 P.3d 984, 988 (Alaska 2019);
Gainesville Woman Care, LLC v. State, 210 So. 3d 1243, 1247 (Fla. 2017); Planned
Parenthood of the Heartland v. Reynolds ex rel. State, 915 N.W.2d 206, 212 (Iowa 2018);
Hodes & Nauser, MDs, P.A. v. Schmidt, 440 P.3d 461, 502 (Kan. 2019).
234. Mark Joseph Stern, Elena Kagan's Blueprint to End PartisanGerrymandering,
SLATE (Sept. 4, 2019), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/09/partisan-gerrymanderkagan-state-courts.html. The September 2019 decision applied to state, not congressional,
districts. On October 28, 2019, the same panel struck down North Carolina's congressional
districting as an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander under the state constitution. See
Michael Wines, State Court Bars Using North CarolinaHouse Map in 2020 Elections, N.Y.
TMES (Oct. 28, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/28/us/north-carolina-gerry
mander-maps.html.
235. See infra text accompanying notes 273--74.
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limits of state supreme courts filling in gaps left open by the U.S.
Supreme Court.
The Washington Supreme Court faced no backlash risks when
declaring the state death penalty unconstitutional in October 2018. Like
2005-15 property rights reforms in nearly every state (following the U.S.
Supreme Court's ruling in Kelo v. City of New London), state courts are
unrestrained when they have the backing of the public and state
officials. 236 Washington too was ripe for death penalty reform. National
support for the death penalty was at an all-time low in 2016; in
Washington State a July 2018 poll found 24% support for the death
penalty as compared to 69% support for life imprisonment or other
alternative. 237 In 2014, Washington Governor Jay Inslee imposed a
moratorium on capital punishment. 238 And while death penalty
legislation remained on the books, the decision to suspend was both
politically popular and did not change the status quo. 239
The Arizona Supreme Court too faced no backlash risks when
limiting the reach of a Phoenix anti-discrimination ordinance.
Concluding that state constitutional protections for freedom of speech
extend to businesses who refuse to sell customized wedding invitations
to same-sex couples, 240 the court backed dominant Republican party
preferences-preferences formally embraced by Arizona in 2017 U.S.
Supreme Court filings. 24 1 In Arizona, the Republican party has controlled

236. From 2005-15, forty-four states enacted legislation or amended their state
constitutions in response to the Supreme Court's eminent domain decision, Kelo v. City of
New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). See Dana Berliner, Looking Back Ten Years After Kelo,
125 YALE L.J.F. 82, 84 (2015). Seven states with statutory changes imposed additional
protections and state supreme courts increased protections against takings for private use

in three of the six states that did not change state law. Id. at 88. These state court decisions
undoubtedly reflected widespread public and elected official disapproval of Kelo-even in
those states that did not amend their eminent domain laws.
237. DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., Poll: Washington State Voters Overwhelmingly Prefer
Life Sentences to Death Penalty (July 17, 2018), https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/news/pollwashington-state-voters-overwhelmingly-prefer-life-sentences-to-death-penalty.
238. Mark Berman, Washington Supreme Court Strikes Down State's Death Penalty,
WASH. PosT (Oct. 11, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2018/
10/1 1/washington-supreme-court-strikes-down-states-death-penalty-saying-it-is-arbitraryand-racially-biased/?utmterm=.07f021132c2 1.
239. See State v. Gregory, 427 P.3d 621, 627 (Wash. 2018).
240. Brush & Nib Studio, LC v. City of Phoenix, No. CV-18-0176-PR, slip op. at 4 (Ariz.
Sept. 16, 2019).
241. Arizona was one of eighteen Republican states to join an amicus brief arguing in a
near-identical case that bakers had a right under the Federal Constitution to refuse to bake
a cake for a same-sex wedding. See Brief for the States of Texas et al. as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioners, Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm'n, 138 S. Ct.
1719 (2018) (No. 16-111). The Trump Department of Justice also backed this position. See
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Masterpiece
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the governorship and both houses of the state legislature since 2009;242
all seven justices on the state supreme court were appointed by
Republican governors. 243 On LGBTQ issues, liberal education reformers
came into tension with a state law that bans schools from promoting a
"homosexual life-style," a law supported by state Republicans. 244 Against
this backdrop, the state supreme court risked very little by embracing a
broad view of expressive freedom.
Unlike decisions ratifying popular or elected official preferences,
state supreme courts in Alaska, Florida, Iowa, Kansas, North Carolina,
and Pennsylvania faced hostile legislatures or governors. Their decisions
invalidating abortion restrictions and legislature- drawn voting prompted
state lawmakers and governors to strike back. In today's hyper-polarized
world, these backlash risks were predictable. It was also predictable that
the state supreme courts that were willing to risk political retaliation
would come from these states. Alaska, Kansas, and Pennsylvania are
three of the fourteen purple states where the same political party does
not control the two houses of the state legislature and state governor. 245
Iowa and Florida, while now controlled by Republicans, often elect
Democratic governors, and justices named by these governors figured
prominently in the abortion rulings by the Iowa and Florida Supreme
Courts. 246 Moreover, state justices were appointed through judicial
nominating commissions in Kansas, Alaska, Iowa, and Florida (four of
the thirty-four states with such commissions, with Alaska and Kansas
247
being two purple states with such plans).
Relatedly and most significantly, the legal policy views of the state
court were out of sync with elected officials. In today's polarized age,
Republicans at the federal and state level back abortion restrictions and
the power of states to engage iii partisan redistricting; Democrats do

Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm'n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111). By ruling
for the baker on alternative grounds, the U.S. Supreme Court did not resolve the case's
First Amendment claim-thereby paving the way for state supreme courts to address this
issue on state constitutional grounds.
242. State Government Trifectas, BALLOTPEDiA, https://ballotpedia.org/State-govern
menttrifectas (last visited Sept. 17, 2019).
243. Arizona Supreme Court, BALLOTPEDIA, https:/Iballotpedia.org/ArizonaSupremeCourt (last visited Oct. 5, 2019).
244. See Mariana Dale, Arizona Law Leaves Schools Struggling to Navigate LGBTQ
Issues, NPR (Feb. 24, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/02/24/696572968/arizona-lawleaves-schools-struggling-to-navigate-lgbtq-issues.
245. See State Government Trifectas, supranote 242.
246. See infra notes 255-56.
247. See Methods of Judicial Selection, NAT'L CTR. FOR ST. CTS., http://
www.judicialselection.us/judicial selection/methods/judicial nominating-commissions.cfm
?state= (last visited Oct. 31, 2019); see also State Government Trifectas, supra note 242.

IN THE AGE OFPARTY POLARIZATION

2019]

1169

In each of these cases, the state supreme court rejected the legal
policy preferences of either Republican lawmakers and/or governors. 249
With the exception of Alaska, Democrats or Democratic appointees
played a critical role in all of these decisions. 250 The Alaska Supreme
Court is now dominated by Republican appointees, although Democratic
appointees played a critical role in earlier related holdings that arguably
constrained the 2019 Alaska Court. 251 In Pennsylvania (where state
supreme court justices are elected in partisan elections), five of the seven
who ruled on the Republican legislature's districting map were
Democrats. 252 In North Carolina (where state supreme court justices had
been elected in nonpartisan elections up until 2016 and are now subject
to partisan elections), six of the seven justices are now Democrats. 253 In
Kansas, four of the seven justices who ruled in the abortion case were
Democratic appointees. 254 In Iowa, a Democratic governor appointed two
of the seven state justices who decided the abortion case. 255 In the Florida
abortion case, five of the seven justices were appointed by a Democrat (if
you count the three appointments of Republican-turned-Democrat
Charlie Crist). 256
not.248

248. For a detailing of state polarization on abortion, see Neal Devins, Rethinking
JudicialMinimalism, 69 VAND. L. REV. 935, 962-82 (2016).
249. See infra text accompanying notes 258-82.
250. Id.
251. In Alaska, Republican governors appointed four of the five current justices. Alaska
Supreme Court, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Alaska-SupremeCourt (last visited
Sept. 18, 2019). Nonetheless, earlier Democratic appointees arguably played a figural role
in the 2019 Alaska decision. The 2019 decision reaffirms a 2001 Alaska Supreme Court
ruling on this question. See State v. Planned Parenthood of the Great Nw., 436 P.3d 984
(Alaska 2019) (citing State v. Planned Parenthood of Alaska, Inc., 28 P.3d 904 (Alaska
2001)). At the time of the 2001 decision, three of the five justices were appointees of
Democratic Governor Tony Knowles. See List of Justices of the Alaska Supreme Court,
WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wikilList-ofJustices of theAlaska-SupremeCourt
(last visited Oct. 15, 2019).
252. PennsylvaniaSupreme Court, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/PennsylvaniaSupremeCourt (last visited Sept. 18, 2019); see League of Women Voters v.
Commonwealth, 178 A.3d 737 (Pa. 2018).
253. Supreme Court of North Carolina, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/
SupremeCourt-ofNorth Carolina (last visited Oct. 5, 2019); see Stern, supra note 234.
254.

Kansas

Supreme

Court,

BALLOTPEDIA,

https://ballotpedia.orgKansasSup

remeCourt (last visited Sept. 18, 2019); see Hodes & Nauser, MDs, P.A. v. Schmidt, 440
P.3d 461, 502 (Kan. 2019).
255. Iowa Supreme Court, BALLOTPEDIA, https:/Iballotpedia.org/IowaSupremeCourt
(last visited Sept. 18, 2019); see Planned Parenthood of the Heartland v. Reynolds ex rel.
State, 915 N.W.2d 206, 212 (Iowa 2018).
256. Florida Supreme Court, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/FloridaSupreme
Court (last visited Sept. 18, 2019). Democrat Governor Lawton Chiles appointed two of the
seven and Governor Crist appointed three of the seven. Id.; see alsoGainesville Woman
Care, LLC v. State, 210 So. 3d 1243, 1247 (Fla. 2017).
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In today's polarized age, moreover, there are fewer and fewer purple
stateS 257-SO that there will be fewer and fewer state supreme courts with
a mix of Democrat and Republican justices. More than that, the political
backlash following these decisions highlights the risks of such counter
majoritarian decisions. On abortion, for example, three of the four states
(Alaska, Florida, Iowa) who ruled in favor of abortion rights suffered
severe political setbacks. 258 The exception was Kansas-where the state's
Democratic governor used her veto power to defend (at least for now) the
state supreme court from political attack. 259
In Iowa and Florida-two formerly purple states that are now red
states-legislative reforms and gubernatorial appointments have
resulted in a rightward shift of the state supreme court. Iowa, in
particular, highlights the risks of bucking the dominant political party.
Specifically, Iowa lawmakers responded to the state supreme court's
June 2018 decision invalidating a seventy-two hour waiting period for a
woman seeking an abortion by changing the judicial selection process
from a merit selection plan where lawyers and the senior justice on the
Iowa Supreme Court dominated the nominating commission. 260 By
jettisoning this system in favor of a system where the governor appoints
a majority of the nominating commission, Iowa's Republican Governor
Kim Reynolds was able to "transform [ the Iowa Supreme Court from one
that leaned liberal to a solidly conservative body." 261

257. See State Government Trifectas, supra note 242.
258. See infra text accompanying notes 260-69.
259. John Hanna, Kansas Lawmakers Fail to Override Governor's Abortion 'Reversal"
Veto, PBS NEWSHOUR (May 1, 2019), https://www.pbs.o7g/newshour/nation/kansaslawmakers-fail-to-override-governors-abortion-reversal-veto. For additional discussion, see
Johnathan Shorman, Abortion Opponents Say They'll Wait Until 2020 to Seek to Change
Kansas Constitution, WICHITA EAGLE (May 2, 2019), https://www.kansas.com/news/politicsgovernment/article229942719.html.
260. Planned Parenthood of the Heartland v. Reynolds ex rel. State, 915 N.W.2d 206,
212, 246 (Iowa 2018); see also Katarina Sostaric, Iowa Governor Signs Judicial Selection
Changes into Law, IOWA PUBLIC RADIO (May 8, 2019), https://www.iowapubhlicradio.org/
post/iowa-governor-signs-judicial-selection-changes-law#stream/0.
Iowa lawmakers also
debated an amendment to the state constitution that would have nullified the court's
decision. See Marisa Endicott, Iowa's Supreme Court Protected Gay Marriageand Abortion
Rights-and Republican Lawmakers Are out for Payback, MOTHER JONES (Apr. 8, 2019),
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2019/04/iowas-supreme-court-protected-gay-marria
ge-and-abortion-rights-and-republican-lawmakers-are-out-for-payback/.
261. David Pitt, Iowa Supreme Court Takes a Right Turn under Gov. Reynolds,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (July 3, 2019), https://www.apnews.com/357e55b3c4ca4432b8a4605
21f9034ff; see also Stephen Gruber-Miller, Kim Reynolds Signs Bill Giving GovernorsMore
Powerover Iowa Supreme Court Selection, DES MOINES REG. (May 8, 2019, 4:04 PM), https:/
/www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/politics/2019/05/08/kim-reynolds-signs-changesgiving-governors-more-power-over-iowa-supreme-appeals-court-selection/ 1142445001/.
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Judicial selection also figured prominently in Florida's response to a
February 2017 decision blocking a law that required a woman seeking an
abortion to wait at least twenty-four hours after her meeting with her
doctor. 262 In January 2019, Florida's newly elected Governor Ron
DeSantis-who had campaigned both against the state supreme court
and abortion rights in 2018 263-promised to fill three seats on the Florida
Supreme Court with "appointees [who] will interpret the law, be willing
to reverse bad precedent and not legislate from the bench." 264 Governor

DeSantis favorably referenced the Federalist Society and U.S. Supreme
Court Justice Clarence Thomas as models of judicial decision-making. 265
By April 2019, Governor DeSantis's three picks began overruling earlier
state supreme court rulings and, in so doing, ushering a new era of
conservative judicial decision-making. 266
In Alaska, the state's governor used his budgetary item veto power
to take aim at the state supreme court for a February 2019 ruling that
the state constitution's equal protection clause does not allow the state
legislature to restrict Medicaid funding to "medically necessary"
abortions. 267 In July 2019, pro-life Governor Michael Dunleavy responded
by reducing the state supreme court budget by $335,000, the same
amount that the state spends on elective abortions. 268 Dunleavy noted in
his veto message that "[tihe legislative and executive branch are opposed

262. See Gainesville Woman Care, LLC v. State, 210 So.3d 1243, 1264-65 (Fla. 2017).
263. See Alexandra Glorioso, Putnam and DeSantis Vow to Sign Abortion-Ban Law If
Elected, POLITICO (June 28, 2018), https://www.politico.com/states/florida/story/2018/06/28/
putnam-and-desantis-vow-to-sign-abortion-ban-law-if-elected-494539.
264. Ron DeSantis, DeSantis: Environment, Education, and Economy Are Among My
Top Priorities, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Jan. 4, 2019), https://www.orlandosentinel.com/
opinion/os-op-ron-desantis-florida-governor-priorities-inauguration-20 190104- story.html;
see also John Lucas, DeSantis's State Supreme Court Appointments Cause Concern for
Abortion Rights Groups and Others, CAPITOLIST (Jan. 14, 2019), http://thecapitolist.com/
desantis-state-supreme-court-appointments-cause-concern-for- abortion-rights-groups-and
-others/.
265. See Lloyd Dunkelberger, DeSantis Vows to Get Busy Fast, Make His First Supreme
Court Appointment Wednesday, SUNSHINE ST. NEWS (Jan. 8, 2019, 6:00 AM), http://
www.sunshinestatenews.com/story/desantis-vows-get-busy-fast-make-his-first-supremecourt-appointment-wednesday.
266. See John Kennedy, DeSantis Appoints Third Florida Supreme Court Justice,
Completing Conservative Makeover, HERALD-TRIB. (Jan. 22, 2019, 6:14 PM), https://
www.heraldtribune.comlnews/20190122/desantis-appoints-third-florida-supreme-court-jus
tice-completing-conservative-makeover; see also Jim Saunders, Reversals Show New Day
on the Supreme Court, SUNSHINE ST. NEWS (Apr. 20, 2019, 7:30 AM), http://
www.sunshinestatenews.comlstory/reversals-show-new-day-supreme-court.
267. See State v. Planned Parenthood of the Great Nw., 436 P.3d 984, 988 (Alaska 2019).
268. Ethan Millman, Abortion Rulings in Alaska Prompt Governor to Cut Court
Funding, WALL ST. J. (July 19, 2019, 10:29 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/alaskagovernor-cuts-court-funding-in-response-to-abortion-rulings- 11563546556.
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to state funded elective abortions .... The only branch of government
that insists on state funded elective abortions is the Supreme Court." 269
In Kansas, the state legislature failed in its efforts to override an
April 2019 decision rejecting a state ban on the most commonly used
procedure for second trimester abortions. 270 The decision was widely
condemned by state lawmakers, prompting legislative approval of new
abortion restrictions and talk of a constitutional amendment. 2 71
However, Democratic Governor Laura Kelly vetoed the abortion bill and
the Republican legislature fell two votes short of overriding the veto. 272
Republican legislative leaders then decided to wait a year to build the
required two-thirds support for the amendment in each house of the
Kansas Legislature. Unlike Florida, Alaska, and Iowa, the Kansas
Supreme Court has thus far been protected by divided government.
North Carolina courts too may now be protected by divided
government. In the immediate aftermath of the 2016 gubernatorial
election of Democrat Roy Cooper, however, North Carolina courts were
under attack. Before Cooper was sworn in, the Republican legislature
and then-Republican Governor Pat McCrory worked in tandem to change
judicial selection and retention methods in ways that would favor
Republican interests. 2 73 For example, following the success of Democrats
in nonpartisan judicial elections, legislation was enacted in 2016 to
mandate partisan elections of state supreme court justices. 274 Before
Republicans could reap the intended windfall of partisan elections, a
panel of state trial judges ruled in September 2019 that the state's
legislative districting scheme was unconstitutional under the state
constitution. 275 Republican lawmakers acquiesced to this ruling rather
269. Id. Republican lawmakers also proposed cutting court funding and amending the
Alaska Constitution to abolish abortion rights under the state constitution. See John
Aronno, Lawmakers Add Anti-Abortion Amendment to Budget and Advocate for Adoption
as an Alternative, ANCHORAGE PRESS (Apr. 9, 2019), https://www.anchoragepress.com/

news/lawmakers-add-anti-abortion-amendment-to-budget-and-advocate-for/article28f61c
b8-5b25-11e9-9ad8-3fa3d6a685dc.html.
270. See Hodes & Nauser, MDs, P.A. v. Schmidt, 440 P.3d 461, 466 (Kan. 2019).
271. See Hanna, supra note 259.
272. Id.; see Shorman, supra note 259.
273. Mark Joseph Stern, North CarolinaRepublicans'Legislative Coup Is an Attack on
Democracy, SLATE (Dec. 15, 2016), https://slate.com/human-interest/2016/12/northcarolina-legislative-coup-an-attack-on-democracy.html; see also Ari Berman, Courts Keep
ThwartingNorth CarolinaRepublicans. So They're Trying to Remake the Courts., MOTHER
JONES (Jan. 23, 2018), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2018/01/courts-keep-thwart
ing-north-carolina-republicans-so-theyre-trying-to-remake-the-courts/.
274. See Stern, supra note 273.
275. Common Cause v. Lewis, 18 CVS 014001, 2019 N.C. Super. LEXIS 56, at *13-14
(N.C. Super. Sept. 3, 2019). This Superior Court decision applied to the districting of the
state legislature. Id. On September 27, 2019, a related state constitutional lawsuit was filed
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than appeal to the overwhelmingly (6 to 1) Democratic state supreme
court; 276 Republican lawmakers apparently thought they would better

advance their interests by redrawing state districts. 277 And for good
reason-in 2018, Democrats on the state supreme court signaled their
disapproval of Republican lawmaker efforts to shape judicial selection; 278
lawmakers, moreover, were unlikely to find some new way to
constitutionally punish the justices (especially with a Democratic
governor who had already sought to stop earlier Republican attacks on
the court). 279
In Pennsylvania, the state supreme court has also persevered against
political attack. In January 2018, the court dealt a body blow to state
Republicans by declaring that the state's congressional districting
scheme violated the "free and equal elections clause" of the state
constitution. 280 Following the decision, Republican lawmakers considered
launching an effort to impeach the Democratic justices that rejected the
lawmakers' districting plan. 28 1 Instead, the state Senate approved
challenging North Carolina's congressional districts. Amy Gardner, Holder-Affiliated
Group Launches New Challenge to Partisan Gerrymandering in North Carolina, WASH.
POST (Sept. 27, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politicsfholder-affiliated-grouplaunches-new-challenge-to-partisan-gerrymandering-in-north-carolina/20 19/09/26/c7574b
5a-e0al-1 1e9-8dc8-498eabcl29a0_story.html.
276. See Will Doran, Judge Orders Transparency for New NC Maps, Citing "Highly
Improbable" GOP Assurances, RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVERS (Sept. 4, 2019), https://
www.newsobserver.cominews/politics-government/article234707272.html.
277. The same is true of North Carolina lawmakers' response to an October 2018 panel
decision invalidating the state's map for congressional districts. Rather than appeal to the
North Carolina Supreme Court, lawmakers set about to redraw district lines in a way that
honored the court ruling while still favoring Republican candidates. Gary Robertson, North
Carolina Lawmakers Redraw State's CongressionalMap, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Nov. 15.
2019, 7:19 PM), https://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/nation-world/national/article
237391154.html. Lawsuit plaintiffs, however, cried foul and asked the panel to throw out
the new map. See id.
278. Democrats on the state supreme court had earlier backed the state's Democratic
governor in his efforts to neuter Republican lawmaker efforts to concentrate power in the
state legislature. See Mark Joseph Stern, North Carolina Supreme Court Strikes down GOP
Attempt to Control Elections Board, SLATE (Jan. 26, 2018), https://slate.com/news-andpolitics/20 18/0 1/north-carolina-supreme-court-strikes-down-gop-elections-board-power-gra
b.html.
279. Craig Jarvis & Anne Blythe, Veto Override Means Voters Will Know Judges' Party
Affiliation, RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVERS (Mar. 23, 2017), https://www.newsobserver.coml
news/politics-government/state-politics/articlel40327188.html.
280. League of Women Voters v. Commonwealth, 178 A.3d 737, 818 (Pa. 2018). For a
thoroughgoing analysis of how state constitutions can be used to challenge partisan
gerrymandering (with an extended discussion of Pennsylvania), see Samuel S.-H. Wang et
al., Laboratoriesof Democracy Reform: State Constitutions and PartisanGerrymandering,
U. PA. L. REV. 18-19 (2019).
281. Charlie May, PennsylvaniaRepublicans Want to Impeach Supreme Court Justices
that Killed Their Gerrymander Scheme, SALON (Feb. 6. 2018, 3:51 PM), https://
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legislation in June 2018 to create judicial districts that would elect state
judges-an effort to mitigate the power of large cities (Pittsburgh,
282
Philadelphia) that typically support Democratic judicial candidates.
That bill was not enacted but, in May 2019, the Judiciary Committee of
the Pennsylvania House approved a similar bill.283
Were Pennsylvania to approve this legislation, three of the five state
supreme courts that battled elected officials will have seen basic changes
to the judicial selection process (Iowa) and/or to the role of ideology in
judicial appointments (Iowa and Florida). Alaska too saw its state
supreme court's budget slashed and the Kansas Legislature both enacted
a repeal bill and, when that bill was vetoed, came within one vote of
overriding the veto. These backlash risks obviously cut against state
supreme courts upsetting elected government preferences. In the age of
party polarization, moreover, the legal policy views of state justices are
increasingly in-sync with elected official preferences. Thirty-six states
are now controlled by one or the other political party; 284 in these states,
elected judges and gubernatorial appointees will inevitably reflect
dominant political values. Even in merit selection states (where
governors choose from finalists identified by a nominating commission),
governors will gravitate to the candidate that best advances the political
values of the governor's party (and nominating commissions are likely to
285
both reflect and be sensitive to the dominant political culture).
V. CONCLUSION
"Justice Brennan's 1977 paean to judicial federalism" struck a
chord. 286 More than forty years later, as California Supreme Court
www.salon.com/2018/02/06/pennsylvania-republicans-want-to-impeach-supreme-courtjustices-that-killed-their-gerrymander-scheme/.
282. S.B. 22, 2017 Leg., Reg. (Pa. 2017); see Staff and Wire, Pennsylvania Senate Votes
to Change the Way Judges Are Elected, THE MORNING CALL (June 13, 2018, 2:40 PM), http:/
/www.mcall.cominews/nationworld/pennsylvania/capitol-ideas/mc-nws-pennsylvania-judge
s-elections-20 180613-story.html.
283. See John Baer, The Legislature Is Again Courting Changes for Pa. Courts, PHILA.
INQUIRER (May 14, 2019, 4:19 PM), https://www.inquirer.com/opinion/john-baer-courtsreform-diamond-legislature-20190514.html.
284. State Government Trifectas, supra note 242.
285. The elite legal establishment in red and blue states is likely to reflect elite values
in that state. Over the past two decades, Democrat and Republican elites have become more
and more polarized. See NEAL DEVINS & LAWRENCE BAUM, THE COMPANY THEY KEEP: How

PARTIsAN DIVISIONS CAME TO THE SUPREME COURT 2-3, 5, 121 (2019). This polarization has
impacted the community of lawyers who both become judges and have social connections to
judges. Id. at 45-48, 145-46, 148. It is hard to imagine that this polarization will not also
spill over to the community of elite lawyers who serve on judicial nominating commissions.
286. Liu, supra note 15, at 1365.
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Justice Goodwin Liu observed, "[w]e may be at a similar moment." 287 In
the age of party polarization, "the changing composition and increasingly
conservative tilt of the U.S. Supreme Court" will create numerous
opportunities for state supreme courts to fill gaps in individual rights
protections. 288 Unlike the modest revival in state constitutionalism
triggered by the Brennan article, 289 however, I am skeptical that there
will be a revival of state constitutionalism in the age of party
polarization. The gravitational pull of federal norms is strong and party
polarization makes that gravitational pull even stronger. Today, all
politics is national and federal courts and federal norms are more
important now than ever before. Perhaps more importantly, state
supreme court decision-making is now situated in the political agenda of
national political parties and interest groups; voters and state
legislatures, in turn, are more willing to check state supreme court
justices. In deep red and deep blue states, moreover, lawmakers,
governors, voters, and state supreme court justices are likely to agree
with each other-so much so that there will be fewer occasions where the
legal policy preferences of state justices are out of sync with elected
official preferences.
None of this is to say that state supreme courts will not issue
important state constitutional rulings, some of which will expand
individual rights protections. With state supreme courts deciding around
2,000 state constitutional cases each year, 290 there is little question that
state supreme courts sometimes make a difference. Some state
constitutions have individual rights protections or affirmative rights that
are not in the Federal Constitution; state courts will be called upon to
give effect to these provisions. Sometimes (as was true with the Kelo
property rights decision) a U.S. Supreme Court ruling will be out-of-sync
with prevailing voter and elected official preferences. 29 1 Sometimes a

287. Id.
288. Id.
289. According to Dan Rodriguez, Justice Brennan's article was "avowedly strategic" and
the "renaissance of state constitutional law" that Brennan called for has been "rather
modest" in its contributions. Daniel B. Rodriguez, State Constitutional Theory and Its
Prospects, 28 N.M. L. REV. 271, 271 (1998); see also Gardner, supra note 79, at 762-64; Ann
Lousin, Justice Brennan's Call to Arms-What Has Happened Since 1977?, 77 OHIO ST. L.J.
387 (2016).
290. "State supreme courts decide more than ten thousand cases each year, roughly
twenty percent of which involve state constitutional issues." Devins, supra note 24, at 1635.
291. See Berliner, supra note 236, at 88.
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state supreme court will feel the benefits of expanding rights outweigh
the risks of electoral defeat. 292
Nonetheless, I am far more pessimistic than optimistic. For the
reasons detailed in this Article, state supreme courts are likely to back,
not buck, the U.S. Supreme Court-sometimes because they agree,
sometimes because it is the path of least resistance, and sometimes to
preserve their jobs. In the age of party polarization, the U.S. Supreme
Court and federal norms seem more supreme than ever.

292. This is particularly true in states where state supreme courts are politically
insulated and in purple states where state justices' legal policy views diverge from other
state officials. See supra text accompanying notes 25-32, 222-25.

